4 reasons Turkey may be holding up NATO expansion

Even 10 days ago, the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO looked like smooth sailing. President Biden applauded the May 15 announcement that the two Nordic nations were seeking membership in the 30-country military alliance, an enlargement that would double NATO’s borders with Russia. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg promised to fast-track their entry into the defense club that was originally formed to check Soviet advances and now functions as a barrier to thwart Russia’s expansionist ambitions, as evidenced in Ukraine.

But the predicted easy voyage to membership promptly hit an iceberg in the form of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, president of Turkey, NATO’s easternmost member. Initially hinting that Turkey did not feel “positively” about the Nordic countries, he hardened his stance last week, saying, “We have told allies that we will say no to Finland and Sweden's NATO membership." Turkey also blocked NATO’s attempt to speed up the two countries' accession to the alliance, with Erdogan saying they would transform NATO into “a place where representatives of terrorist organizations are concentrated.”

By Tuesday, as delegations from Sweden and Finland arrived in Turkey to meet with Erdogan’s deputy foreign minister, the situation had become so volatile that an Erdogan ally, Devlet Bahceli, head of the Nationalist Movement Party, suggested to his party’s legislators that Turkey, one of the alliance’s original members, should consider leaving NATO if it is forced to accept Sweden and Finland into the club. “Turkey is not helpless,” he said, adding: “We will not perish without NATO.”

Turkey’s posturing — and close bonds with Russia — is leading some to wonder if that may be where this standoff is heading. “Quite frankly,” Elizabeth Shackelford, a former U.S. diplomat who served in Europe and Africa, told Yahoo News, “if NATO cannot move forward with Sweden’s and Finland’s accession, I think it’s going to be one of those times when we start wondering if Turkey is actually that useful inside the alliance.” Shackelford, now a senior fellow on U.S. foreign policy at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, added, “But I don’t think we’re there yet.”

With potential stakes so high, Turkey’s stance bears more thorough examination. Analysts say long-standing issues from Kurdish militants to canceled arms deals underlie Erdogan’s objections, including a delicate balancing act with Russia, a crucial trading partner for Turkey. They point to a multipronged list of Turkey’s concerns.

Uneasy relations with the West — the U.S., Europe and democracy

In power since 2003, first as prime minister and then, since 2014, as president, Erdogan is often at odds with Western democracies. Leading a country that geographically straddles Europe and Asia, he was initially lauded for developing infrastructure and boosting Turkey’s economy, but he has become increasingly autocratic, censoring media, driving out opposition and steamrolling dissent — including unleashing his security against Turkish protesters — and attacking Kurds in Syria in 2019, an invasion that triggered international condemnation and sanctions.

His strong-arm tactics raise a red flag in the European Union, the 27-country umbrella government and the world’s biggest economic bloc, which Turkey has unsuccessfully been trying to enter since 1999. Erdogan's actions prompt frequent rebukes from the U.S. and from NATO, where all other members are Western democracies. “Turkey and Europe have a love-hate relationship,” Soner Cagaptay, director of the Turkish Research Program at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and author of “The New Sultan: Erdogan and the Crisis of Modern Turkey,” told Yahoo News. “And Turkey’s population loves a good fight with Europe.”

Recently Biden sidelined Erdogan, refusing to meet at a NATO summit in March and not including him in his “Summit of Democracies” — blow-offs not missed by the Turkish media. Shackelford sees Erdogan’s actions partly as “pushback against this narrative that Biden has been leading of democracies versus autocracies. I think Erdogan will get what he wants, because he’s in a power position, but I think he’s enjoying the fact that he can wield power over someone like Biden.” The Turkish president, she said, “is basically demonstrating that he can punch above his weight.”

But if his relationship with Biden isn’t particularly warm, it was the Trump administration that gave Erdogan a slap that still stings: kiboshing a major arms deal and not refunding Turkey’s $1.4 billion deposit. Which is to say the whole flap about Turkey’s F-35s.

Flying machines

Turkey was among nine NATO countries that put in orders for F-35s, the world’s most advanced stealth fighter jets, complete with high-tech bells and whistles like vertical landing capabilities, folding wings and night vision/thermal imaging helmets that provide 360-degree viewing of vistas. But after putting down a deposit for four of these “quarterbacks of the skies,” Erdogan in 2019 purchased an advanced air defense system from Russia.

After warning him not to, the U.S. canceled his order, with the White House issuing a statement saying, “The F-35 cannot coexist with a Russian intelligence-collection platform that will be used to learn about its advanced capabilities” — and booting Turkey entirely from the F-35 program. Erdogan has been screaming for his money back ever since, recently saying the funds could be applied to the purchase of less secretive F-16s, but approval for that, which the Biden administration supports, is currently being held up in Congress.

Russia

Erdogan is also performing a tightrope walk with Russia, which supplies a third of Turkey’s energy and much of its food, as well as gas through the recently opened TurkStream pipeline. What’s more, “Russia has a number of critical infrastructure investments in Turkey, including the building of Turkey's first nuclear reactor,” Istanbul-based Asli Aydintasbas, senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, told Yahoo News.

Although Turkey openly opposed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, blocked Russian warships from entering the Black Sea and sold drones to Ukraine, Turkey, “unlike some other countries on NATO's eastern flank, is unwilling to antagonize Russia,” Aydintasbas said. In fact, Turkey is “providing a lifeline to Russia by keeping lines of communication open, keeping its economy going and not slapping Russia with sanctions,” she said.

“Erdogan and Putin have a strong bond — they see each other and talk often,” said Cagaptay. “Economically, the ties are deep.” He thinks Erdogan is signaling Putin with his threat of blocking Sweden's and Finland’s entry. “Erdogan is basically telling Putin, ‘I may have upset you by giving Ukraine dozens, even hundreds, of drones, but I’m giving you one veto in NATO — aren’t you happy about that?’”

Aydintasbas sees Erdogan’s actions as “a cautious approach towards Russia” that reflects Turkey’s divergent view of the war in Ukraine, and its fear that the Ukraine conflict may be just the beginning. “The sentiment with other NATO allies is very different. They think this is a big defining moment for the West — and that, ultimately, ‘Ukrainians — our guys — are winning’ and that it will bleed Russia. That’s not the sentiment on the Turkish side.” Ankara, she said, is “worried about an escalation, that Russia won’t stop there and the West will have a hard time countering its actions.”

Erdogan’s moves reflect Ankara’s belief that “the future is a multipolar world where Russia and China will also be players," Aydintasbas said. "So that's why you see a more cautious balancing act on the part of Turkey.”

Whatever its reasons, the relationship “is a big thorn in the side of the rest of NATO,” said Shackelford. “It’s an obstacle” that has created “a real discomfort — going back to Turkey buying the missile systems from Russia. If you are coordinated and interoperable with NATO, other NATO members don’t want you to be that intertwined with the Russian military.”

Longtime enemies — the Kurds

The issue that Erdogan has been most public about, however, is the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), an armed guerrilla movement born in the 1980s to preserve the Kurdish language and culture. Turkey has been fighting it for nearly four decades, with at least 30,000 dying in the conflict.

“Turkey does have legitimate reasons [for threatening to veto] regarding PKK fundraising networks and activists in Sweden,” said Cagaptay, who believes Erdogan is striking more at that country than Finland. “NATO designates the PKK as a terror entity. So Turkey rightfully expects Sweden to take action on this.” A related concern, he added, is the PKK’s Syrian offshoot, the People’s Protection Units, known as the YPG, a group the U.S. and other Western countries relied on in fighting ISIS in Syria. Turkey tolerated that move, he said, but the West, including Sweden, has kept up a relationship with the YPG even after ISIS was defeated. “I think what Turkey wants to do is set a precedent with the Swedish accession” — demanding that Sweden downgrade, perhaps even cut, ties with the organization — “hoping that this will set a precedent for all NATO members, present and incoming.”

“Sweden has long been a supporter of the Kurdish cause in general — and this particular government [in Sweden] has been openly sympathetic of the Syrian Kurds that Turkey considers terrorists,” said Aydintasbas. “But a quarter of the NATO allies are working with the same groups, and everything Erdogan says about Sweden is also true of the United States. So it’s also a case of screaming at Sweden, saying the things that he cannot tell America for fear it would create an uncontrollable escalation with the Biden administration.”

While some analysts have suggested that going after Sweden because of its PKK affiliation is a way to bolster domestic support for Erdogan, who is facing an election next year, Aydintasbas, for one, doesn’t think it's a huge deal for many Turks. “Erdogan’s popularity is plummeting,” she said. “The economy is heading toward a hyperinflationary cycle,” with inflation rates nearing 70%. And with the same leader in power for nearly 20 years, “there’s an ‘Erdogan fatigue’ — particularly among younger voters. So he’s very aware that he has to pull a rabbit out of a hat.” But even though it’s increasing Erdogan’s profile on the world stage, “this Sweden issue is not it.”