Analysis: A new British foreign policy for a more dangerous world

At the end of the Cold War, the historian Francis Fukuyama infamously declared the "end of history."

Western liberal democracy and free markets, the idea went, had triumphed. From now on. the world would join together in a harmonious march to a democratic, capitalist future.

Today, that prediction seems bitterly naive. And the Integrated Review marks the moment Britain formally admits History only paused.

There are two main drivers for this rethink.

For more nearly half a century, British foreign policy was anchored on two pillars: membership of the European Union and the "special relationship" with the US.

The theory was that those relationships complemented one another, acting as powerful magnifiers of British influence across the globe.

But Brexit has blown that orthodoxy out of the proverbial water.

Because the EU can no longer act as a lever for British power, Britain is to some degree less interesting to the United States.

That was a problem Boris Johnson's government was always going to have to tackle after leaving the EU.

But this is not just about Brexit.

The truth is, the global status quo that Britain has sought to defend since 1945 is crumbling.

Western and American economic and geo-political dominance is being challenged by China, which the Review euphemistically refers to as a "systemic competitor."

Russia has reemerged as "the most acute direct threat to the UK."

Meanwhile, there are more conflicts raging than at any point since the end of the Second World War; the global advance of liberal democracy promised by the end of the Cold War threatens to go into reverse; and the threat of climate change is forcing fundamental changes in the way we live.

Boris Johnson's answer is multifaceted.

First there is the hard power: increasing spending on defence, and a raise on the maximum number of nuclear warheads the UK can hold - symbolically reversing decades of commitment to post-Cold War disarmament.

The commitment to return aid spending to 0.7 percent of GDP after the Covid pandemic will please Tory backbenchers and those who prioritise "soft power."

Then there is the diplomacy: explicitly reaching beyond the European and Atlantic regions to boost alliances with Australia, India, and Japan.

Through it all runs the theme of a grand a new technological revolution and investment in science.

Critics will point out that this 120 page document is rich on rhetoric but short on detail.

Others will say it does not deliver the radicalism that the scale of the challenge demands.

And money is tight: there will inevitably be a gap between capability and ambition.

But in spirit, the document marks an important moment: History is back on, and it could be a rough ride.