Analysis of US military aid to Ukraine since Feb. 24

The U.S. Department of Defense has published a complete list of arms supplies to Ukraine on Oct. 14, starting from Feb. 24. The list is long, so I decided to structure it to make it easier to take in:

A) Artillery and missile weapons:

1. M142 HIMARS missile and artillery systems — 38 (without specifying the number of missiles);

2. 155 mm and 105 mm field howitzers — 178;

3. 155 and 105 mm high-explosive shells — 1,083,000 (yes, over a million!);

4. 155 mm M982 Excalibur high-precision projectiles — 3,000;

5. Special 155 mm projectiles for remote placement of RAAMS anti-tank mines — 7,000;

6. 120 mm mortars — 20;

7. 120 mm mortar mines — 115,000;

8. 70 mm launchers and with unspecified number of laser-guided missiles;

B) Aviation and air defense:

1. NASAMS anti-aircraft missile systems — 8 (without specifying the number of missiles);

2. Rockets for portable anti-aircraft missile systems Stinger — 1,400;

3. Mi-17 multipurpose helicopters — 20;

4. HARM self-guided anti-radar aviation missiles — without specifying the number of missiles;

5. Airspace surveillance radars — 10;

6. Systems of radio-electronic combat against drones - unspecified number and types.

C) Reconnaissance and special weapons:

1. Scan Eagle reconnaissance drone systems — 15 (3 drones in the complex, modern drones);

2. Puma reconnaissance unmanned systems — an unspecified number (obsolete drones from army reserves);

3. Long-range artillery reconnaissance radars of the AN/TPQ-36 type — more than 50;

4. Short-range artillery reconnaissance radars - 4;

5. Multipurpose radars — 20 (probably short-range AN/MPQ-64 Sentinel radars, which are used to identify air targets and artillery reconnaissance);

6. Radars for unmanned drones — 2;

7. Electronic warfare systems — unspecified number and types;

8. Satellite space imagery services — unspecified number and types.

D) Armored vehicles and cars:

1. M113 armored personnel carriers — 200;

2. MaxxPro heavy armored vehicles — 440;

3. Command and staff vehicles — 4;

4. Light armored HMMWVs — hundreds (according to previous reports, at least 400 in total);

5. Tactical machines for towing guns — 276;

6. Tactical repair and evacuation vehicles — 22;

7. Heavy cargo trucks — 44;

8. Trailers for transportation — 88;

9. Armored medical evacuation vehicles — 100.

D) Fleet:

1. Harpoon anti-ship missile systems — 2;

2. Patrol sea and river boats — 18;

3. Unmanned minesweepers — unspecified number and type.

E) Anti-tank and infantry weapons:

1. Switchblade and Phoenix Guest shock kamikaze drones — 1,400;

2. Missiles for portable Javelin anti-tank systems — 8,500 (without specifying the number of launchers);

3. Missiles for TOW-2 portable anti-tank systems — 1,500

(without specifying the number of launchers);

4. 37,000 M136 AT4 and M72 anti-tank grenade launchers;

5. Anti-personnel mines and explosives — unspecified quantity;

6. Mine detectors and trawls — an unspecified number;

7. Small arms and 40 mm grenade launchers — 10,000;

8. Ammunition — 62 million rounds;

9. Night vision devices, optical and thermal sights, rangefinders - thousands (the exact number is not determined);

10. Body armor and helmets — 75,000 sets;

11. Tactical radio stations - unspecified types and number.

Conclusions:

2. The United States is still not supplying heavy weapons systems, such as fighter jets, Patriot anti-aircraft missile systems, Abrams tanks, and ATACMS ballistic missiles. Arms supplies are thus unbalanced. This is due to the cautious policy adopted jointly by NATO countries regarding the scale of arms supplies to Ukraine and limiting the level of escalation of hostilities. NATO is acting in response to Russian escalation, not preempting it.

3. Even despite its losses, the Russian Federation maintains a tangible advantage in heavy weapons, and in some types of heavy weapons — an absolute advantage, which enables Russia to inflict significant losses on Ukrainian forces. In order to stop the war and force Russia to cease hostilities, a qualitative advantage in heavy weapons is needed. It is the quality of the heavy weapons that will overcome Russian numbers even during offensive operations of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

4. In order to overcome the Russian Federation, it is necessary to maintain supplies, at least in the same volumes in all positions, plus a significant increase in heavy weapons, including those types and classes that are not currently supplied. Modern combat aircraft with high-precision weapons would make it possible to reduce the burden on artillery and air defense. It is possible to prevent the prolongation of the war for many years only if NATO supplies Ukraine with higher quality and technologically advanced weapons – primarily combat aircraft and air defense systems, tanks, ballistic missiles and REP and electronic warfare equipment, and if NATO maintains the scale of the supply of those types of weapons that have already been provided over the last eight months.

Read the original article on The New Voice of Ukraine