The Army Is Readying Armored Vehicles That Spy, Jam, and Hack Enemy Drones
Few institutions can devise opaque acronyms like the military, and even then, the ‘Terrestrial Layer System’ (TLS) is a doozy.
But don’t let that fool you—it may be one of the U.S. Army’s most important modernization programs, resulting in a new fleet of tracked and wheeled armored vehicles that will help spy on and jam enemy communications, hack into their computers, throw off the aim of incoming missiles, smart bombs and guided artillery projectiles, and bring hostile surveillance and kamikaze drones crashing to the ground without firing a shot.
In other words, TLS is a suite of ground-based electronic warfare systems—including signals intelligence (both for listening in on enemy communications, as well as identifying and geolocating transmitters), electronic attack (jamming and satellite navigation spoofing) and cyberwarfare capabilities—that were formerly on separate platforms. They’re integrated into an open-architecture system using common standards (CMOSS) that should allow easy future updates.
In development for several years, the Pentagon seriously stepped up with funding over the last month. In March and April respectively, they awarded Lockheed-Martin $33.6 million and $35.4 million to install TLS on three of its eight-wheeled Stryker troop-carrier vehicles at a facility in Syracuse, NY. These are specifically the 18-ton M1133 armored ambulance model, due to its extra electrical-generating capacity. Those awards supplement $58.9 million awarded to Lockheed last July for the work.
An operational test of the Stryker TLS is planned for around September, 2023. Lockheed’s concept art suggests that these vehicles may mount three dome or pod-shaped antennas over the rear hull, as well as additional arrays.
But in April, the Pentagon also gave Lockheed $37.4 million to sketch out plans to install TLS on two factory-fresh AMPV tracked fighting vehicles as well. The 40-ton multi-purpose vehicles are based on the turretless hull of the Bradley fighting vehicle, and only began operational service in March of 2023 with the U.S.’s 1st Armored Brigade. They are slated to replace a menagerie of support vehicles based on the Vietnam War-era M113 APC, boasting 78% more internal volume and greatly improved protection.
The Army has requested $84.6 million to procure six more TLS-equipped Strykers in 2023. They also originally planned to spend $201 million to acquire 24 more TLS-BCT systems in 2024, but that funding has been downsized to another $84.6 million.
Now the Army plans for each of its 31 combat brigades (or BCTs) to have their own dedicated platoon of either Stryker or AMPV vehicles equipped with TLS, depending on whether those brigades use tracked Bradleys or Strykers. The Army also eventually intends to field a lighter, cheaper backpackable system, for its light infantry and airborne brigades.
The Army has also formed five EW platoons and one EW company for its Special Forces Groups and the 75thRanger Regiment respectively. Starting this year, the service also plans to form an EW company for each of its divisions corps headquarters by 2027 and 2029.
By late 2022, sixteen brigades had stood up the new EW platoons, which are nested in the brigade’s Military Intelligence company. Until TLS is fielded, Army electronic warfare units will use Stryker and Flyer72 trucks equipped with Tactical Electronic Warfare System (TEWS). Longer-range signal intelligence is also performed by the General Dynamics AN/MLQ-44A Prophet system mounted on an M1165 up-armored Humvee. The National Guard units will receive these EW systems as they are replaced with TLS.
Layers Upon Layers
The Terrestrial Layer System actually has several layers of its own. The Strykers, AMPV and portable TLS assigned to brigades are the forward, tactical layer under the designation TLS-BCT.
The Army also plans to field a large Multi-function Electronic Warfare (MFEW-AL) pod on its MQ-1C Gray Eagle combat drone to provide electronic intelligence and attack support. Likely, this could be used to pinpoint activity by wireless or cellular comms, provide rapid response jamming, or conduct EW missions close to—or over enemy—lines without risking crew lives. Reportedly, MFEW-AL could be integrated into additional types of drones.
Furthermore, there’s a rear-area system being developed called the TLS-Echelon Above Brigades (TLS-EAB). This is to include both a longer-range variant of the TLS-BCT operated by eight crew, and a separate HEDEA defensive jamming system used to misguide incoming drones, missiles and artillery shells—likely intended to protect headquarters and EW units from precision attacks. It will be networkable with air defense assets, but feature less integration overall than TLS-BCT. There is reportedly uncertainty as to whether electronic attack capabilities will be useful over longer distances that will be resolved through testing.
TLS-EAB will initially integrate into the Army’s Multi-Domain Task Force units—which provide a grab-bag of specialized capabilities—and may eventually also be attached to division and corps HQs. Initial fielding in an MDTF is expected by fall of 2024, though additional capabilities are planned after service entries. Because these will be situated well behind the frontline, the TLS-EAB will be installed in or towed by FMTV tactical trucks.
The various TLS assets will be networked together using the Electronic Warfare Planning and Management Tool (EWPMT) software that allows higher headquarters to coordinate—and even remotely control—geographically dispersed EW systems. That’s vital in order to avoid electronic ‘friendly fire’ affecting own-side sensors and communications, which appears to have proven problematic for Russian forces in their initial invasion of Ukraine. By leveraging satellite communications, EWPMT is designed to remain effective even when affected by jamming.
A EWPMT laptop prototype called “Raven Claw” was initially tested in Germany in 2018. It networked together the portable VMAX jamming and VROD radio-direction finding system with the vehicle-mounted Sabre Fury system. The test revealed problems using M-ATV vehicles and long software boot-up times.
A report released in 2023 shows that a test of EWPMT increment 1 with the 2nd Stryker Brigade in Colorado went more satisfactorily, stating it:
“…contributed to successful engagement of high-payoff targets, provided effective tools for spectrum management, and improved the brigade commander’s and staff’s situational awareness of the electromagnetic operating environment.”
It also states that EWPMT was “easy to learn and use,” demonstrated “high operational availability,” and that software faults were quickly remedied—though testers wanted further evaluation of cyber defense. A decision for wider procurement of EWPMT is scheduled for the third quarter of 2023, though delays with the MFEW-AL pod means it’s interoperability with EWPMT won’t be tested until 2025.
Lessons of Electronic Warfare in Ukraine
The ‘terrestrial’ in TLS refers to the fact that, for decades, U.S. electronic warfare has primarily been air-based, using a mix of larger signals intelligence planes like the RC-135, drones, and electronic attack aircraft. The Army retired ground-based electronic attack capabilities after the fall of the Soviet Union.
However, after Russian forces effectively used electronic warfare against Ukrainian forces in 2014-2015, it dawned on Pentagon leadership that in a war with China or Russia, ground forces simply couldn’t expect to have aerial EW support 24/7, due to those countries’ air defenses and air power.
And with the accelerating use of cheap drones for surveillance and attack, even lesser state adversaries and insurgents could pose a serious aerial threat to U.S. ground forces, as seen in the recent death of a U.S. contractor in Syria to a Iranian-built kamikaze drone.
High-intensity combat in Ukraine since 2022 has only underscored the vital role of ground-based electronic warfare. Though Russia’s initial electronic and cyber attacks fizzled, by the summer, jamming was proving highly effective against drones which averaged only 7 days of activity before loss. Jamming/spoofing can also be used to throw off the accuracy of satellite-guided HIMARS rockets or the glide bombs increasingly being used by both sides.
Conversely, electronic warfare assets have proven effective at geolocating enemy emitters—including air defense radars, warships, headquarters full of communications equipment, and opposing EW systems. This allows for weapons like HIMARS, cruise missiles, or combat drones to target those enemy emitters with extreme precision.
Due to their effectiveness, EW systems are also highly appealing targets for attack, with photos showing that Russia has lost at least a few dozen in combat. While the armor on a Stryker or AMPV is far from impenetrable, it will help those vehicles survive hits or near misses from non-anti-armor weapons.
The Army’s focus on fielding the forward, tactical layer of TLS vehicles appears wise. The electronic warfare environment witnessed in Ukraine shows that EW capability must be distributed across combat units, not just pooled under control of higher headquarters or concentrated in large aircraft. As the battlefield is saturated with smart munitions and drones capable of lethal precision attacks, the wizardry of electronic warfare units that can identify the location of distant adversaries and enable or disrupt those strikes is a matter of life and death to soldiers on the frontline.
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