Biden can turn his controversial deal with Venezuela into long-overdue progress | Opinion

For a quarter century, the United States has tried unsuccessfully to stem Venezuela’s democratic backsliding and alignment with American adversaries. With last week’s prisoner exchange and earlier U.S.-orchestrated electoral roadmap signed by the Venezuelan government and opposition, the Biden administration has a chance to succeed where its predecessors fell short.

The election accord reached in Barbados in October, followed by the conditioned lifting of some U.S. economic sanctions on Venezuela, raised hopes for a credible presidential vote next year and a bit of relief for an impoverished populace that has borne the brunt of sanctions on top of economic mismanagement by Nicolas Maduro’s government.

Critics decried the agreement and accused the Biden administration of offering concessions to an autocratic government with a record of noncompliance with negotiated deals. In this case, however, negotiations between the United States and Venezuela already have resulted in a series of positive developments.

First, the Maduro regime agreed to accept flights of Venezuela migrants deported from the United States.

Second, the Venezuelan government allowed an opposition presidential primary to proceed, crowning the regime’s arch-critic Maria Corina Machado as leader of the opposition.

Third, Venezuelan political prisoners and Americans held by the regime have been released.

Fourth, the Carter Center, one of the organizations designated to observe next year’s election, has visited Venezuela.

Fifth, the Venezuelan national election body initiated an update of its the badly outdated voter registry.

Sixth, a fugitive who fled the United States before sentencing for bribery and corruption was returned from Venezuela, though the price was apparently the release of a Colombian businessman indicted in the United States for money laundering on behalf of the Maduro regime.

Seventh, the regime is allowing Machado, whom the government has disqualified from standing as a candidate, to appeal her ban.

Inducing Venezuela’s government to take these measures was an impressive diplomatic feat given that Maduro undoubtedly is aware of polls showing he would lose a genuine election in a landslide.

Now comes the hard part, starting with the defining issue of Machado’s candidacy. The United States will not be able to recognize an election in which a candidate who won more than 90% of the vote in a high-turnout primary is prohibited from running.

The Biden administration retains leverage, however. Treasury Department licenses authorizing transactions involving Venezuelan oil and gas, mining and financial instruments expire in mid-April. By that time, the regime will be expected to have lifted the ban on Machado and taken other steps, including formally inviting election observers and providing equal media access.

The Venezuelan government might be betting that if it violates the Barbados accord — by, for example, again arresting democratic activists — the Biden administration will be hesitant to reimpose sanctions that could undermine its own interests. More Venezuelan oil on the market would lower gasoline prices, albeit modestly, and a growing Venezuelan economy could reduce illegal migration.

The administration, however, repeatedly has insisted publicly that it will re-impose sanctions if Venezuela does not meet its electoral commitments. The question is what form a new sanctions scheme would take, as some Biden aides will argue against reimposing all the sanctions it inherited from the Trump administration.

It is worth recalling that Trump advisors had described sanctions on Venezuelan oil as the “nuclear option” and hesitated to impose them for fear they would further cripple the Venezuelan economy without removing Maduro. Unfortunately, that is what happened. The Trump administration predicted in 2019 the regime would fall in a matter of days or weeks. What might have been part of a plausible policy gambit at the time is not necessarily suitable five years later as the Venezuelan opposition eschews rebellion in favor of negotiations and elections.

The best-case scenario, of course, is that implementation of the Barbados agreement will obviate the need for the United States to reimpose or refashion sanctions on Venezuela. That would be a win not just for Biden, but, more important, the Venezuelan people who have suffered for far too long.

Mark Feierstein, senior advisor at the U.S. Institute of Peace and Albright Stonebridge Group, was senior director for Western Hemisphere Affairs on President Obama’s National Security Council.