What can we expect from Belarus in coming months
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Should we expect news from the Belarusian direction in the near future?
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Russia fired missiles from the territory of Belarus again. On the same day, Ukrainian intelligence announced a possible false flag provocation - an attack by mercenaries of the Wagner PMC on the Mozyr Oil Refinery. Both events were actively commented on in the Ukrainian information space – especially the missile attack. Some commentators gave several mutually exclusive versions of events, each time adding more to the story even after the Ukrainian military clarified the basic information.
It is somewhat unwise to follow this algorithm. Instead, I propose to discuss the logic of the process. Which will lead us to the answer to the question: "Should we expect news from the Belarusian direction in the near future?"
Background
1. Lukashenko was counting on Ukraine's quick surrender, and the dates of the Russian invasion were "convenient" for him – he held a referendum on the new constitution on February 25. The Kremlin was preoccupied with Ukraine, not controlling the Belarusian political process.
In addition, since mid-2021, Viktor Medvedchuk has been a frequent visitor to Minsk, having had six (6) meetings with Lukashenko or his entourage between September and February. The timing seemed "perfect" – you had the combination with the constitution and the "new government" in Ukraine, with whom they had discussed everything in advance. And he himself seemed to be "out of the picture" (after all, the "new government" would talk about Russian aid, not aggression).
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2. It didn't work out. Russia slowed down and then fled from Kyiv. And what seemed like a highly favorable combination became a threat to its position. The Kremlin pressed for participation, but the population's mood was unequivocal – about 80% were against the participation of Belarusian troops in the war against Ukraine.
3. Another danger has suddenly emerged from the constitution "written for Lukashenko." Two "surprises" appeared in the new document. Namely, Article 18 (which previously spoke of neutrality) was amended to say: "The Republic of Belarus excludes military aggression from its territory against other states." That is, we have a direct action norm – a prohibition. An interesting phrase also appeared in Article 88: "The President may be removed from office by the All-Belarusian People's Assembly in case of systematic or gross violation of the Constitution by the President."
4. The changes to the Belarusian constitution were a formalization of the palace coup. The key word is "aggression." That is why, especially since April 2023 (the entry into force of the new version of the Constitution and the Russians' flight from Kyiv), Lukashenko has been so nervous about the words "aggression" and "aggressor." He is scared. From that moment, the first pause in the rocket attacks on Ukraine from the territory of Belarus began.
Where can we look for a definition of aggression? Belarusian legislation lacks a clear definition of aggression. However, Belarus (then the BSSR) voted for UN Resolution 3314 and ratified the text of the convention defining aggression. Article 3 reads: "an act of a State which permits its territory, which it has made available to another State, to be used by that other State to commit an act of aggression against a third State."
Thus, the UN wording is also valid in Belarus. This is not all. There is no definition of aggression, but there is a definition of the term "attack" (Article 4 of the Martial Law), where one of the forms of attack is "actions of another state (coalition of states) that allows the use of its territory by a third state for an attack.”
Official Minsk is Fearful
Lukashenko began to gradually "slide away" from the topic of military participation in what the Kremlin calls the SMM. There was even an attempt to have a "repeat of 2014" with Minsk being a mediator.
Inside the country, the propaganda did not contradict its Russian counterparts, but instead built on it. Belarusian propaganda had its own features, emphasizing the "role of Lukashenko," who "did not allow Belarus to be drawn into the war." At first, they simply named “external forces” as being to blame. Later, they thought that this approach was too bold and daring, so they switched to "Western countries and other external forces." At the same time, Russia is naturally shown as a friend, brother, matchmaker, and generally a good drinking buddy. It's also scary, especially in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war or Russia's ability to undermine the situation inside the country (Lukashenko remembers the role of the Russian media in 2006-2007, 2010-2011, 2019-2020).
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Russia's pressure to intensify collaboration is limited to constant exercises and the deployment (on a rotational basis) of 4-5 BTGs of the Armed Forces of Belarus along the border with Ukraine. At the same time, the contingent of the Russian Armed Forces is gradually being reduced. First, the regular military was replaced by mobilized soldiers, and then they began to leave. However, Russia either has deployed or will deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of Belarus (or may appear), and some personnel of the Wagner PMC have relocated there.
Minsk has attempted to balance the dominance of the Russian Federation. One of the vectors was the accelerated pursuit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, especially since the autocracies of Central Asia demonstrated the effectiveness of this path. China sent signals in response and resumed contacts, but Beijing tends to pull Minsk from Moscow's pocket into its own gradually without going for a sharp confrontation.
Read also: Wagner mercenaries in Belarus pose threat to Ukraine – UA commander
The second area was the desire to find understanding in the EU. But the situation here is extremely complicated: the Belarusian autocracy became temporarily ungovernable after 2020. The conflict has entered the most profound phase since the collective departure of EU ambassadors 20 years ago and the conflict (also related to post-election repression) in 2011-13. That is, the theme of war is superimposed on the theme of democracy. Official Minsk tried (and is still trying) to bargain in the format of "democracy aside, let's talk about distancing ourselves from the war." But there is another difficulty on this path. Even if neighboring EU countries may have favored finding common ground in the past, the conflict with Poland and Lithuania has reached a level that excludes this possibility, at least until elections in these countries. Against this backdrop, although not aggravating the situation, Latvia is by no means seeking to intensify contacts.
Finally, the third direction was Minsk's insistence on getting into the grain agreement as a participating country by any means necessary. In addition to the financial interest in unblocking potash exports, there was a more critical political track. A country that provides a transit area has a chance to distance itself from further participation in the aggression.
Ukraine's Position
At this stage, it is inexpedient for Ukraine to scale up the war. On the one hand, an additional front (albeit with a demoralized enemy army) requires additional forces and means. We don't have that much. On the other hand, scaling up the war and involving another state creates the risk of its further expansion. If it becomes not a Russian-Ukrainian war, but a "regional" war, then it is up to more parties to reach peace agreements (as well as their format, for example, the thesis of returning all Ukrainian territories).
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At the same time, the threat from Belarus remains. There is the Russian factor, and there is distrust of Lukashenko and his entourage – these people have clearly shown how dangerous it is to take them at their word. As a result, Ukraine keeps a relatively large group of troops near the Belarusian border. They demonstrate that any attempted attack will lead to big problems for the aggressor.
The questions of what to do with the Belarusian regime and how to bring it to justice have been postponed to the post-war period, as this topic is mainly derivative of the subject of Russian responsibility.
Russia Tries to Tie Us Down and Cover Us with Blood
Russia has two goals. One is obvious: to create maximum difficulties for Ukraine. They want to maintain the background of a constant threat from Belarus and, if appropriate, again try to persuade Lukashenko to take a more active part in the war against Ukraine.
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The second is formulated differently: to maintain and strengthen its influence in Belarus. They aim to keep Belarus as a dependent territory in the zone of Russian influence. That is why any attempts by Minsk to look for alternatives are met with a fairly quick reaction from Moscow.
As an example, I will cite the previous missile attacks from the territory of Belarus.
August 2022. Discussion of the grain deal and Minsk's initiative to become a transit country for Ukrainian grain to Lithuanian ports. The idea began to be discussed at the UN level. But Lukashenko is flying to Putin. At the same time, two Russian Tu-95s fly into the airspace of Belarus and launch over Ukrainian territory. This is a good argument that it would be foolish to perceive Minsk as a party capable of guaranteeing something (and, let me remind you, it was about guarantees of safe and free transit).
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October 2022. The Belarusian Foreign Ministry holds a series of consultations with European politicians on distancing itself from the war. Information about this gets into the European press. At the same time, Belarus intensifies its dialogue with China, and a joint declaration establishes a level of relations "one step higher" than China's relations with Russia. Lukashenka is back with Putin, and Russian missile launchers are conducting launches in Belarus. Moreover, negotiations between pilots and, possibly, Belarusian military controllers are being streamed online.
Next, we have information about the deployment of nuclear weapons in Belarus and Putin's later consent to relocating Wagner's troops to the country. On the one hand, this is a threat to their neighbors. But, more importantly, it is a fixation on the status of the Russian Federation. To understand the point, imagine a situation where Lukashenko is no longer in power. The reason is not important - death, coup, revolution, soft transit - what is important is that the country has a new government, at least formally. Logically, external players would try to contact the new government and determine the possibility of building relations. But when there are nuclear weapons and a PMC base, the first "call" from both the West and the East will be not to Minsk but to Moscow. They must ask: "What about warheads?" and "What about mercenaries?" In this format, even a weak Russia, disorganized in case of defeat in Ukraine, remains a "player" in the Belarusian political solitaire.
What About Today?
Over the past ten days, the Belarusian issue has become more active – Ukrainian intelligence reports on the possible preparation of a "false flag provocation" using the Wagner PMC. The goal is to attack the Mozyr Oil Refinery, an enterprise with which Alexander Lukashenko has an "uneven relationship."
Read also: Poland detains Belarusian spy collecting intelligence about the Polish ports and military facilities
And finally, a report of a missile attack from the territory of Belarus. The phrase "missiles from the territory of Belarus" gave rise to several versions in Ukraine. There was a missile from the Iskander ground-based systems, false targets, and aviation use. Naturally, there are many discussions about the possible need to retaliate. A day later, the military command clarified that these were "Kinzhals" launched from the territory of the Russian Federation that flew over the territory of Belarus.
The question arises: why is Russia doing this today?
Look at the calendar. The next session of the UN General Assembly will take place in September 2023. At which a rather impressive Foreign Ministry delegation will represent the Belarusian side. There will likely be consultations on the sidelines on the "Belarusian issue."
Negotiations will likely resume (and a new agreement may be reached) on a grain deal by October. Against the backdrop of Russia's attacks on Ukrainian ports, rail transit may become relevant again. This means that there will be an attempt by Minsk to enter into agreements.
Both are against Russia's interests. This means that Moscow is looking for how to do more provocations. Moreover, at this stage, the Kremlin also benefits from increased tensions at the border. After all, the additional forces that Ukraine keeps in the Belarusian direction could otherwise be used as reserves near the front line. Escalation will require deploying more units in the Belarusian direction, drawing them away from the south.
Thus, the Belarusian direction in August and September will be rich in newsworthy events – and perhaps even provocations.
Read also: Russia, China exploring paths for military collaboration, says Pentagon
On the other hand, China's participation in the consultations in Saudi Arabia indicates a gradual change in Beijing's position. And, speaking of Belarus, China is one of the forces capable of hinting to Putin that it is not the time or place for unnecessary provocations.
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Read the original article on The New Voice of Ukraine
