Facing the diplomatic challenges of 2024

Ukrainians will enter the year 2024 with mixed and complex feelings. Despite the belief in victory, it is already clear that the war with Russia is dragging on, so we face dramatic twists, turns, and dilemmas.

The central problem of 2024 was clearly outlined by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Valeriy Zaluzhnyi, in his essay for The Economist: How do we escape the trap of positional warfare? Both we and our international partners must decide on a further military and political strategy that will respond to Russia's plan of attrition. The effectiveness of this strategy will determine the future prospects of the war against the Russian aggressor.

Another urgent challenge related to the war is whether we have enough resources.

It is not only about weapons and ammunition, but also about macroeconomic and financial support for our country. This situation is influenced by both objective and subjective (political) factors.

The stockpiles in the arsenals of NATO countries are being depleted to some extent. No one expected such a long war in Ukraine. In addition, a war has broken out in the Middle East, which could also drag on. The expansion of military production in the United States and other NATO countries has already begun, but it is not happening as fast as we would like. However, we can predict that the countries that are part of the Ramstein Coalition will continue to provide military and technical support to Ukraine, as it is in the strategic interests of the United States, NATO, the EU, and the G7 countries. In 2024, we can expect the delivery of American F-16 fighters. If Russia intensifies hostilities, the United States and other NATO countries may increase the quality of military and technical assistance to Ukraine, including the supply of long-range missiles.

The regularity and volume of aid to Kyiv will be increasingly influenced by political turbulence and the accumulation of socioeconomic problems in the United States and some EU countries. The growing inter-party struggle in America is already clearly demonstrating this, creating problems for the US budget process and the provision of financial assistance to partners. In the year of the US presidential election, the situation will only get worse.

In the EU, some of Putin's "friends," including the Hungarian government led by Viktor Orban, face similar problems. Unfortunately, this may lead to fluctuations in the pace and scope of support for Ukraine. We should be prepared for a gradual reduction in direct budgetary assistance to Ukraine. The Cabinet of Ministers and the Verkhovna Rada should prepare appropriate financial safeguards and savings mechanisms to ensure our defense capability and socio-economic stability.

Election Expectations

The central dramatic dilemma of 2024 is war or peace: continuation of the war to liberate all the occupied territories or acceptance of proposals to end hostilities to prevent excessive exhaustion of the country and restore forces to continue fighting the enemy.

The prolongation of the war and the uncertainty of the prospects for its end will increase the number of supporters of the cessation of direct hostilities, even if part of Ukraine's territory remains under Russian occupation. Within the country, there may be a debate between those who insist on continuing the war against Russia until all the occupied territories are fully liberated and those who support agreements on even a temporary cessation of hostilities.

But the possibility of ending the war will depend on more than Ukraine.

All supporters of peace must understand that calls for "reconciliation" will not lead to a quick end to the war, but will only provoke Russia to seek revenge for the defeats of the first year of the invasion. The Kremlin will likely drag out the war against Ukraine, at least until after the US presidential election. The only way to stop Russia and force it to at least cease hostilities is through force and effective resistance. Both foreign pacifists and domestic supporters of peace at any cost should understand this.

2024 is a period of significant elections around the world. The United States and Russia will hold presidential elections, though that means different things between them. The lower house of Congress and one-third of the Senate in the United States will also be re-elected. The outcome of these elections will significantly impact Washington's future policy toward Ukraine and Russia, but in 2025.

Of great geopolitical importance will be the presidential and parliamentary elections in Taiwan, the results of which will determine the military and political situation around the island and relations between the United States and China. This will have an indirect impact on US policy toward Ukraine, just as the crisis in the Middle East has.

We should also remember the European Parliament elections in June 2024. They are unlikely to change the EU's policy of supporting Ukraine. But there may be a change in EU leadership, which must be considered.

The global election fever may eventually infect Ukraine, despite the unpopularity of elections during war. Under what conditions can elections be held in Ukraine? The most obvious answer to this question is when the war is over. But it is far from certain that the current war will end in 2024. If the fighting gradually turns into a low-intensity war (as in Donbas from March 2015 to January 2022), and public opinion in Ukraine begins to lean toward supporting elections, then the likelihood of them will increase. But this will require either lifting martial law or legislative changes to the legal regime of martial law.

Window of opportunity

If there is a prospect of genuine peace talks, this will also facilitate elections. Our international partners will advise us to hold presidential (and possibly parliamentary) elections first and then go to negotiations to have a legitimate mandate for certain agreements. One way or another, the topic of elections during the war will be discussed in 2024. But the likelihood of presidential and parliamentary elections depends on the coincidence of military, domestic, political, and international circumstances.

If parliamentary elections are held in 2024, a new Cabinet of Ministers will be formed. However, a more realistic scenario for a government turnover in Ukraine (including a change of prime minister) is in the event of increased political and social tensions and economic problems. However, Denys Shmyhal will likely become the record holder for the longest tenure as head of the Cabinet of Ministers. He will be able to celebrate the fourth anniversary of his government on March 4, 2024.

If the political trends that emerged in the second half of 2023 continue, we may see an escalation of the domestic political struggle in 2024. Then, Ukraine will face another dramatic dilemma: preserving national unity to effectively resist an external enemy or resuming an active internal political struggle to refresh the government. The second option is risky in a war with a powerful enemy like Russia. However, its temptations for some politicians and public figures are already evident.

In the foreign policy realm, 2024 may become a period of both challenges and windows of opportunity for Ukraine's European and Euro-Atlantic integration. The challenges will be associated with a significant increase in the turbulence of international relations. We will need to look for a more flexible foreign policy strategy. The window of opportunity will open primarily on the path to European integration. In the spring of 2024, negotiations on Ukraine's accession to the EU may begin, unless Hungarian Prime Minister Orban prevents it.

Another window of opportunity for Ukraine is the NATO anniversary summit in Washington on the 75th anniversary of the founding of the North Atlantic Alliance. Many Ukrainians still await an invitation to join NATO, even with an open date. As long as the war continues, this is extremely unlikely. If the United States and NATO eventually decide on a strategy to support Ukraine in the face of a protracted war against the Russian invasion, then positive and creative options for Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic integration may suddenly emerge.

In 2024, the situation with negotiations on security guarantees for Ukraine from the G7 countries may also become apparent. However, agreements on international security guarantees will likely be tied to potential negotiations on ending hostilities in Ukraine.

To summarize, the year 2024 seems to be quite problematic. But I will add optimism. Ukraine is a paradoxical country. Our very optimistic and inflated expectations do not come true (which, unfortunately, was evident in 2023), but as a rule, very pessimistic forecasts do not come true either. Ukrainians can surprise the world and themselves. Still, we should not rely on fortune alone. We must remember that the country's fate is in our hands, and our shared future depends on what we do and how we respond to our challenges.

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Read the original article on The New Voice of Ukraine