Former military commander on two scenarios Ukraine faces in the war – interview
Largely dependent on sustained Western military aid to Ukraine, Kyiv is now facing two potential ways the war with Russia will develop in 2024 and beyond, Yevhen Dykyi, a veteran of the Russo-Ukrainian war and former company commander with the Aidar battalion, said in an interview with NV Radio on Jan. 7.
Other topics of the discussion include Russia’s ongoing efforts to seize Avdiivka in Donetsk Oblast and Ukrainian attempts to establish a durable beachhead on the left bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast.
NV: It’s been rather ‘loud’ in Crimea in recent days: we’ve hit two Russian airfields near Saky and Belbek. Does this mean that Crimea will now be less instrumental in long-range Russian strikes on Ukraine?
Dykyi: No, it won’t happen just yet. The point is that the Russians have no choice, they have nothing to replace Crimea with. They will hold on to Crimea until the end, trying to attack us from there. The further they go, the less [means] they will have to do so, because Crimea has become well-accessible to us.
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This is an old story that began when the HUR [Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence] special forces captured the so-called “Boyko towers” [oil and gas drilling platforms between Zmiinyi Island and the western coast of Crimea], eliminating the Russian radar system there. It was followed by a consistent chain of operations, first of all HUR ones, together with the Air Force. It’s like peeling an onion — layer-by-layer. This is how the air defenses of the Crimean Peninsula were dismantled, layer-by-layer.
We can already state that there are no targets on the peninsula beyond our reach. For the Russians, this peninsula is irreplaceable both as a bridgehead from which our territory is attacked, and as a huge rear supply depot for the entire southern group, which is fighting in Kherson Oblast and on the so-called “Surovikin Line” [a system of trenches, minefields, and fortifications named after Russian general Sergey Surovikin] in Zaporizhzhya Oblast. They simply have nothing to replace either this depot or this bridgehead.
The confrontation will only grow. They will use the peninsula as much as possible, whereas we will methodically, consistently, and step by step nullify everything they have there.
NV: How will they defend themselves? Can we assume they will bring in more anti-air assets to Crimea?
Dykyi: They will bring more, yes. But we must understand they don’t have a lot of air defense means. So far, they have enough anti-air to cover the front line tightly enough. They have already removed air defense equipment from the Kuril Islands to bring here, while Pantsir air defense systems were brought from beyond the Arctic Circle to cover Moscow.
It logically follows that every loss of an air defense system is very painful for them as it will become increasingly difficult to replace it.
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Air defense systems, especially launchers and radar systems, aren’t something that their defense industry can produce as fast as missiles. These are not just some armored vehicles. It’s very expensive equipment and most importantly, something that has been made for years and is currently under sanctions. It’s not a given that it can be produced at all. Therefore, yes, they will bring more and more air defense systems there as long as they have them. This “as long as” isn’t as fantastically long as it might seem.
NV: Russian troops may step up efforts to seize Kupyansk in Kharkiv Oblast in the coming weeks. But they are allegedly not ready for large-scale offensive operations in Kharkiv Oblast, according to the U.S.-based Institute for the Study of War (ISW). Is seizing Kupyansk really the main goal for Moscow now?
Dykyi: In my opinion, in order for it to become the main goal, they must abandon the previous one. They currently have a political aim of taking Avdiivka, because even a dimwitted Russian general would not set that as worthwhile objective.
“Bakhmut 2.0” is currently taking place there. Our troops have established a very well-organized foothold at the Avdiivka Coke Plant. It’s almost like the Azovstal Iron and Steel Works: there are many underground floors, and concrete ceilings that can withstand aerial bombs. An awful, terrible “meat grinder” is currently taking place in the Avdiivka industrial zone, into which the Russian invaders enter one by one in so-called “meat waves” and remain there.
The casualty ratio is even better [for Ukraine] than it was in Bakhmut, where we had 1:8. But it was an ordinary residential area in Bakhmut, while Avdiivka is properly fortified. They can’t abandon the attempt to capture the town refuse it, since, as far as we can tell, this is a task directly from the Kremlin. If they suddenly abandon Avdiivka now, they would have troops to transfer towards Kupyansk.
Let’s look further south. We have a bridgehead in Krynky on the left bank of the Dnipro River [in Kherson Oblast], which is really like a thorn in Russia’s side. It’s terribly dangerous for them, and they haven’t been able to gather a sufficiently large group for four months to oust our troops from the area. And this is very telling. They can no longer afford two big offensives. Either Avdiivka or Krynky. Where does Kupyansk fit in this plan?
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In general, the offensive on Kupyansk has been underway since June last year. When we began the assault on the so-called “Surovikin line,” they actually began a very competent diversionary maneuver, where their main task was to occupy Kupyansk and build a defense line along the Oskil River. They are as far away from the main task as they were in June last year. But they honestly fulfilled the minimum task since some of our reserves were diverted there. A significant part of the forces that were supposed to break through their defenses in the south had to be taken directly from the training grounds, including those in Europe, to defend Kupyansk.
They advanced from June to August but were completely exhausted. They didn’t advance in September but formed the so-called 21st Combined Arms Army from newly mobilized soldiers. This army has been transferred there since October, began to advance, with little success. But to think that they suddenly have another combined army to rapidly mount a major offensive... I just don’t see that happening.
NV: Could capturing Kupyansk also become a mandated political goal?
Dykyi: Could be. From a military point of view, it would make much more sense than fighting for Avdiivka. But they cannot afford two such goals, so they must somehow persuade Putin to abandon Avdiivka, but the tsar rarely rescinds his orders. We’ll see.
NV: UK intelligence reports that Russia has failed to oust our Armed Forces from the left bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast. How strong are our positions there?
Dykyi: As far as I know (and I have friends deployed there, who have been my brothers-in-arms since 2014), we aren’t just standing our ground there, but expanding our hold. The beachhead there is being expanded, and our troops are consolidating on new frontiers, already beyond Krynky. I won’t say where exactly. I think we’ll get confirmed reports in a day or two.
It’s actually very difficult to fight there. For example, when it’s necessary to transport across waterways, part of the trek must be made chest-deep in cold winter water. And then it’s impossible to dig in on land because when you dig up a meter of soil, ice-cold water also comes up.
I probably don’t remember such moods as the guys have now since the beginning of summer. Such a fighting spirit... They literally see Perekop [a settlement between mainland Ukraine and Crimea] ahead of them, and they are morally fixated on it.
We cautiously call it the left-bank beachhead because we have already been trained to avoid excessive expectations. But Russian military bloggers call it “battles in the Kherson-Crimean area.”
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In fact, it’s 60 kilometers to Perekop [from Krynky]. Perekop is the next goal, while the nearest one is the North Crimean Canal. If we manage to advance to it, we’ll certainly be able to gain a serious and long-term foothold there.
And what we managed to do with Russian aviation really changed the situation. The worst thing that our defenders had to endure, apart from cold water, was the constant attacks with glide bombs. More bombs fell on this beachhead alone than on the rest of the front line. And the only saving grace is that these glide bombs are rather inaccurate.
Now the situation has changed, because it turns out that vaunted Russian ace pilots are very brave only when they know that they are beyond the reach of our air defense. When they just need to take off, fulfil their mission, knowing that they are definitely out of range, that’s fine. But once they found out that Ukrainian air defense can reach up to 160 kilometers behind the front line, the sorties suddenly stopped, ostensibly due to bad weather.
That’s Russian Air Force for you. They are used to punitive action, not fighting. Once they realize that we have something that allows us to reach them, they refuse to fly these sorties.
NV: The United States will reportedly not provide military aid to Ukraine at the level of 2022-2023, because they want us to build our own military-industrial base, State Department spokesman Matthew Miller recently said. How acceptable is it for us now? Can we produce our own ammunition in such quantities?
Dykyi: I’m afraid you understand that the question is rhetorical. Of course not. And it will really be extremely difficult for us, if not disastrous. I would say [this statement] is a prime example of extremely poor communication. It looks like the White House is already starting to admit that the Congress will never agree to allocate additional aid to us in 2024.
The Republicans in the U.S. Congress have taken aid to Ukraine hostage (and in fact the lives of our soldiers and our lives) and started blackmailing [U.S. President Joe] Biden and the Democratic Party over a purely domestic agenda: the Mexican border security. They demand a sharp, one-shot solution to a problem that hasn’t been solved in the United States for about 40 years. And they’re holding us hostage.
It seems that the White House is beginning to admit that it won’t be able to agree and reach some kind of compromise. They decided to somehow sweeten the pill for us, to prepare us morally for it. They did it very clumsily.
Still, I believe that plan A is as follows: the Republicans and the Democrats will somehow compromise in late January, and we’ll be guaranteed at least approximately the same amount of aid in 2024 as it was in 2023. An increase in aid is clearly out of the question, but at least [the aid] will be preserved. Meanwhile, in parallel, we’ll invest everything in the development of our defense industry and will be very grateful if we are allowed to get technology transfers from the United States. This is a good version of the story for us.
If we are being cut off from supplies right now, and they’re simply giving us access to manufacturing technology (because this is something that can be done without the Congress, purely by the executive branch) as a feeble compensation, frankly, this is not much compensation.
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The experience of the United States itself has shown that the development of their own defense industry is a very slow process. For example, it took about half a year for them to resume the production of Stinger MANPADS, after we’ve used up everything that was sitting in storage. At the same time, with extraordinary decisions: they found retired men who once made these Stingers in the 1980s and asked them to urgently start work and teach young people. This is in the United States, with a generally well-established industry.
A prominent example with ammunition. The European Union failed to produce a million shells for us in a year. It wasn’t about politics, and not about money. Plants throughout Europe failed to produce them in a year and produced only a third of this figure.
In this situation, to think that we’ll suddenly perform some fantastic miracle and catch up with the 30-year failure of our defense industry in a few months... Such fairy tales don’t work.
We need at least a year for our defense to start working properly. Even though, thank God, we’re investing in it right now.
First, we need at least a year, and secondly, we’re still doing this amid constant air strikes, in semi-partisan conditions. This is also a very serious limitation that neither the United States nor Europe have.
Therefore, let’s be honest: if the U.S. Congress doesn’t agree on a deal, our entire strategy will change. We’ll have to switch to a strictly defensive posture for 2024, just hold on, and simultaneously conduct a frantic mobilization of all our finances, our entire economy, and invest everything in the development of our defense industry so that the situation will be different by the end of the year. And we’ll have to just hold on during the year.
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We shouldn’t assume this is the only possible scenario. There are still enough opportunities left for the Democrats and Republicans to somehow very painfully, very hard, but strike bargain by late January. It will be another story then and we’ll have a year of normal warfare. At the same time, we still need to develop our own defense industry more quickly so as not to depend on who is elected there: Biden, [likely U.S. presidential candidate Donald] Trump or someone else we haven’t even heard of yet.
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