International warships converge on the Bab el Mandeb, battling Houthi rebels for control
This weekend (there seems to be a pattern emerging here) there was yet another drone engagement in the Red Sea. This time, however, it was the French frigate Languedoc who shot the Houthi drones down rather than the USS Thomas Hudner or the prolific USS Carney.
Since 19 October the Red Sea has seen three separate missile attacks, two acts of piracy – one of which was successful – and many drone attacks. The drone attacks have fallen into three categories; those heading up the Red Sea towards Israel and engaged as crossing targets, those heading towards warships and thus shot down in self-defence (although no nation has yet stated directly that attacks have been made on its warships – that would, of course, be an act of war) and drones heading to conduct damage assessment after some of the missile strikes. It isn’t clear whether the Houthis are doing this under direct or implied orders from the Iranian regime. What is clear is that so far, they have been able to do so without suffering any retaliation.
French reporting into exactly what happened over the weekend has been sparse, suggesting that although still operating under their own national command rather than in any allied command structure, the French have adopted the same posture as the US ships there; to downplay all of this. Nevertheless, inescapable realities are emerging that will need to be addressed if defending international shipping passing through the Bab-el-Mandeb strait is to become an enduring mission. The Bab-el-Mandeb (‘the Gate of Tears’) is the narrow piece of water at the southern end of the Red Sea, through which all shipping to or from the Suez Canal must pass as it leaves or enters the Indian Ocean: it is one of the world’s major maritime chokepoints. Avoiding it would normally mean going all the way south around the Cape at the bottom of Africa.
The things to think about can be put into two buckets: command and control (C2) and logistics.
C2 will become more complex as ships from different countries arrive. So far the US, French, Japanese and Israeli navies have contributed in the Red Sea. It’s possible that HMS Lancaster, the Royal Navy frigate permanently deployed to the Gulf, is already there. HMS Diamond, a British Type 45 destroyer, is en route and currently passing through the Eastern Mediterranean. The US Navy will be pleased with all this support. It adds legitimacy to their presence and provides burden sharing if the task is to endure.
If ships of different countries converge like this on a common mission then the norm is to convene a Combined Task Force (CTF) under which communications, outreach, rules of engagement and operating patterns are shared. The obvious candidate for this is CTF 153, established in 2022 with the Red Sea as its focus. These task force commands are not new; CTF 150 (counter-terrorism), 151 (counter-piracy) and 152 (Gulf security) have been there, among others, for decades now. Most are run from the Combined Maritime Forces headquarters in Bahrain. Operation Sentinel is also there, a UK led combined operation to “ensure the security of seafarers passing through Middle East Waters”. It doesn’t really matter what they use or what it is called, just that a command structure such as this is vital to coordinated maritime operations. If we see one being used, or a new one being set up, it will be a clear sign that this task is set to grow and endure.
The second issue is one of logistics support. This is a complex and essential subject as any maritime logistician will tell you (at length given the chance) so I will just zoom in on two aspects – fuel and ammunition.
Warships are thirsty beasts, particularly ones dashing around at 30 knots intercepting missiles and drones. There are two ways of taking on fuel – alongside in harbour and Replenishment at Sea (RAS) – and there are advantages and disadvantages to both. Fuelling alongside is simple but it often takes time to get there, time that takes you off-task. As an example, if the Languedoc’s reported position for the engagement is correct, then at 18 knots (a reasonable planning speed) it would take her a day and a half to reach Jeddah. Add a day to get in, refuel, and get out then a day and half back then she is away from her patrol sector for four days. Replenish at sea, where the tanker comes to you, and this can be reduced to four hours. Going alongside for short periods is also surprisingly disruptive for ships at high readiness as the crewing requirements are different.
Replenishing at sea is standard procedure for Western navies and they all have specialist fleet support tankers with the necessary equipment, usually belonging to a civilian-manned auxiliary organisation rather than the navy proper. The tanker picks a suitable course and speed and you power your warship into a parallel course with a lateral separation of about 30 yards. Then gear is rigged between the two ships and fuel and/or supplies transferred. In maritime terms the ships are dangerously close together and it’s not something you want to get wrong. Nevertheless, it keeps you at sea, on the move (and therefore harder to target) and if you need to, you can break away quickly (in minutes) to get weapons pointing in the right direction.
However you need enough tankers to support the warships and as mentioned, this number is growing. At present, the USNS Amelia Earhart is in the Red Sea. She is classed as a solid stores support ship but as ever with US ships, she can multi-task and could be supplying fuel at sea to the assorted ships there as described, though she doesn’t have as much as a dedicated tanker. There are also plenty of dedicated tankers in the region: if one heads into the Red Sea, it will be another indicator that this task is set to continue growing.
Being able to get more ammunition if you are ‘shot-out’ is the second logistical challenge. How likely this is depends on how many drones the Houthis send and also what the different ships have in their arsenal to defeat them. If it is something light and replenishable, such as shells for the main gun or close-in weapons systems, then supplies will last for some time: if targets are engaged with missiles, however, there is a danger you could run out quite quickly. We’re not at that level of intensity yet, but planners will have to consider it. The Languedoc only carries 16 anti-air missiles, Aster 15s. And it should be remembered, missiles involve a whole different level of expense. It hasn’t been confirmed if the Languedoc fired Asters at the drones over the weekend but if she did, then that’s a million-dollar missile to destroy a thousand-dollar drone. It’s not rocket science to work out that isn’t sustainable.
HMS Diamond also has Aster missiles, up to 48 of them in her case, and right now getting a reload of those would involve going at least as far as France: it would make popping into Jeddah for fuel look like the blink of an eye. As ever the US is in a better place: the Amelia Earhart probably has missiles aboard, though they can’t be reloaded into launch cells at sea.
There is a broader warfighting point here about the Western navies’ (and militaries in general, come to that) dogged pursuit over recent decades of ‘fewer but more lethal’, ‘exquisite vs functional’. We have ended up with ships which are arguably more powerful, but definitely fewer in number. The land war in Ukraine is proving time and time again that mass has a value all of its own. The Red Sea has the potential to prove this in the maritime domain as well.
The final point is that as these bills start adding up, including insurance premiums for the shipping companies operating there, there comes a point where preemptive action to defeat the threat starts making financial sense.
Comments on this range from “no idea why it hasn’t already happened” to “post Iraq and Afghanistan the US do not want to get involved in another war in the Middle East” and everything in between. But this is an international shipping strait, so like it or not, we are all involved. The US has not been reluctant to act in the past: it happily blew up Houthi-controlled radar stations ashore in 2016. It’s possible that forming and messaging a coalition is the solution that sits in the middle but something needs to be done because eventually, the cost of inaction, either in logistics, insurance premiums, national pride or human life, will outweigh the cost of action.
And we know China, Iran and Russia are watching.
Tom Sharpe is a former Royal Navy officer and warship captain
