Ghost of negotiations. Risks that await Ukraine during the counteroffensive
On the one hand, Western partners are hoping for results. On the other hand, they are not yet ready to make certain critical decisions necessary for these results.
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Ukraine will try to liberate all occupied territories without any division into "before" and "after" February 24, 2022, and Kyiv has formulated this very clearly. None of Ukraine's current partners doubt this. However, possible negotiations are increasingly being discussed in high offices assessing Ukraine's potential for success in the counter-offensive. While there is no compulsion to sit at the negotiating table with Russia, judging by everything, the duration of this carte blanche for the liberation of territories without compromises with the Kremlin may be limited to the next few months – until the end of the year. And it will directly depend on the course of the military operation.
Despite an unprecedented level of armed support for Ukraine, the situation looks strange.
On the one hand, Western partners are hoping for results. On the other hand, they are not yet ready to make certain critical decisions necessary for these results. This applies to long-range missiles that would simplify the precise targeting of Russian military logistics far from the actual front line and decisions regarding the so-called “air coalition.” In other words, Ukraine is preparing and arming itself to liberate the occupied territories. Still, Kyiv’s partners have not made available all of the necessary resources.
At the same time, the specter of possible negotiations with Russia is increasingly being discussed in the context of the course of the war. It is difficult to call this pressure, but there are overt hints to consider the timing and subject of negotiations with Moscow.
The strange, perhaps even cynical, symbiosis of supporting the counteroffensive and probing the ground for possible negotiations can be explained by two factors. Firstly, there are doubts that Ukraine will be able to liberate all occupied territories this year. Secondly, there is uncertainty in the West about what to do with Russia: what specific form of victory for Ukraine and, accordingly, defeat for Russia would be acceptable to them.
Proposals and calculations
That is, the interest in helping Ukraine regain its territories clashes with the desire to prevent serious destabilization in Russia. Western European countries and part of the political elite of the United States are wary of both uncontrolled internal processes in the Russian Federation, which may be provoked by its defeat, and the cementing of maximum dependence of weak Russia on China.
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But without certainty about Russia's defeat, some of Ukraine's partners de facto question the goal of full de-occupation of Ukrainian territories. For now, behind closed doors. The production of weapons, for example, is not being reconfigured to guarantee current levels of support for Ukraine, at least until 2024. It turns out that the current year and the long-awaited counteroffensive - might be the only window of opportunity for the liberation of occupied Ukrainian territories. And the absence of significant success in this direction could potentially intensify the "proposals" to sit at the negotiating table.
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In Kyiv, this is well understood. Ukrainian diplomacy is focused on ensuring support for the counteroffensive and the idea of full de-occupation. It avoids talking about hypothetical negotiations with Russia. It hints that it can negotiate the withdrawal of the Russian contingent from Crimea if it is logistically cut off due to counteroffensive actions in southern Ukraine.
Strategically calculating Ukraine’s prospects in this situation is understandable and justified: to bet on events on the battlefield. Those events will either force the Russians to be more accommodating (as was the case with the right bank of the Kherson region) or finally convince Western partners to support Ukraine until the complete de-occupation of Ukrainian territory. However, Ukraine should be cautious and consider a number of risks and challenges on the diplomatic front.
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The first of them is nuclear blackmail by Russia. Although the probability of Russia's use of tactical nuclear weapons is assessed as low, the possibility of its use in the event of attempts to liberate Crimea, for example, is taken quite seriously in the West. Instead of preemptive action, many are inclined to consider whether Ukraine should insist on the peninsula's liberation.
In the Kremlin, another tool remains unused: the physical placement of ground-based carriers of tactical nuclear weapons on Ukraine's occupied territory, particularly in Crimea. Moscow will try to avoid its defeat and even attempts to de-occupy Crimea. Russia prepared its legislation for this in advance in 2020, when in the Foundations of State Policy on Nuclear Deterrence, it "allowed" itself to use nuclear weapons in the event of aggression against it by conventional armaments if "the very existence of the state is under threat." This fits very well into the narrative of Crimea as "Russian territory" and of a supposed war by the West or the US to destroy Russia, isn't it?
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The second challenge is China and its potential role as a mediator for settlement.
This risk has several dimensions. First, China will be guided by its own interests. They include the necessary weakening, but not the complete defeat of Russia, to strengthening political and economic ties with Europe, particularly the West. Possible mediation by Beijing in the conflict is a claim to participate in shaping the post-war architecture in Europe. This in itself underscores the global significance of Russia's war against Ukraine.
Although China will transmit its own interest rather than Russia’s, the dangers for Kyiv from this will not diminish. Indeed, despite formal support for the territorial integrity of Ukraine in the well-known "China's Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukrainian Crisis" (the name speaks for itself), the withdrawal of occupation forces from Ukraine will not be a condition for this settlement. From the Ukrainian point of view, the mediator's position is not too promising. At the same time, the interest of Western European countries such as France and Germany in intensifying economic ties with China works in favor of the latter.
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However, Kyiv sees more opportunities than risks in involving China in negotiations. The main advantage of Beijing's mediation, both in Kyiv and in Paris, is seen as China's potential influence on Russia. This assumption is not without merit, of course. The main risk for Ukraine is that in exchange for such diplomatic services, China may de facto occupy part of Ukraine and effectively sideline Kyiv from its interests in the negotiations.
China is not interested in "mediating" between Russia and Ukraine. China is interested in mediating between the collective West on one side and Russia on the other. Beijing could negotiate with key Western countries by leveraging its influence on Moscow.
To what extent Ukraine's interests will be taken into account, especially the unequivocal liberation of all occupied territories, remains an open question. The same goes for Ukraine's place on Europe's and the world's security map, the prospects of NATO membership, and fundamental security guarantees for Ukraine. Does the leadership in Bankova fully comprehend this set of risks, hoping for a positive effect of Chinese mediation? It needs to be clarified.
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The international subjectivity of Ukraine during a full-scale invasion today does not raise doubts in any of its partners. That is why plans for negotiations with Russia are not currently being imposed, although they are cautiously studied. The key for Kyiv in this context is to prevent negotiations on post-war settlement in the form of an agreement by global players with a minimized role for Ukraine.
The third diplomatic risk for Ukraine may be a decision by some of its partners to favor a protracted conflict and "Normandization" of the political process surrounding the status quo. The game of negotiations may become a short-term priority for the Kremlin, especially if Ukraine's counteroffensive attempts are successful.
Despite clear official rhetoric that the territorial integrity of Ukraine must be restored, the practical attitude towards the possibility of a stalemate on the battlefield and attempts to "freeze" the situation in different partner capitals varies. For example, other countries' assessments may differ if the hypothetical eastern flank of NATO and the EU unequivocally support the expulsion of Russians from all occupied territories.
It is worth clarifying: a protracted or "frozen" conflict is not a priority scenario for any of Ukraine's main partners. But some may decide this option is acceptable under certain circumstances. For example, what they could see as insufficient success in their counter-offensive – especially if there is no clarity with their strategy towards Russia.
Classic failure
Unfortunately, not all political elites, even among friendly countries to Ukraine, have dispelled their illusions about agreements with Russia. Moreover, they may decide that a conditional illusory truce can shift the conflict from the current hot phase to a more controlled and predictable one. Let's not doubt it: this will be justified as if it is in the interests of Ukraine itself.
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For example, the experience of the Normandy negotiations shows that neither in Berlin nor Paris has learned the lesson of the many unsuccessful attempts to bring dialogue with Russia into a constructive channel. But it would be logical if this lesson of those eight years were formulated as follows: attempts at "freezing" are not an effective means of resolving Russian aggression. Therefore, there should be no basis, neither security nor political, to agree to such a scenario of events as acceptable.
Indeed, Ukraine has better absorbed lessons from the failures of "classical" diplomacy regarding attempts to reconcile with Russia, both before and after 2022. Many Eastern European neighbors support this. This is one of the reasons why the discussion about Crimea, for example, is conducted by Kyiv not only in the light of international law regarding Ukraine's borders but also from the perspective of regional security. Ukraine's logic (absolutely justified) is that leaving part of its territory, especially Crimea, occupied will inherently mean the impossibility of sustainable peace, the end of the war, or freedom of navigation (not only for Ukraine). Furthermore, those who cautiously analyze the possibility of "freezing" the conflict under certain circumstances make another fundamental mistake. Russia doesn't need this, not even in the medium term. Short-term, for half a year or a year, it is possible. However, as a conflict resolution formula, it is not. Russia hasn't achieved any of its goals. It failed to limit Ukraine's sovereignty. Accordingly, the only gain for Russia from such a scenario is to restore its strength, regroup, and try again. But even the complete de-occupation of Ukraine does not guarantee that Russia will not attempt to attack Ukraine again. That is why it is crucial to neutralize Russia's military capabilities as much as possible: both on the battlefield and through sanctions, so that there are practically no opportunities for recovery.
Despite the complexity of these risks and challenges, they can all be mitigated if events on the battlefield unfold in favor of Ukraine. This does not mean that the operation to liberate occupied territories must be swift and massive simultaneously. But it must undoubtedly instill confidence in Ukraine's ability to push out the Russians from its territory. Shifting the balance on the battlefield will strengthen Ukraine's diplomatic position, not only in the eyes of its partners, but also players like China.
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