James Pfister: The nuclear and conventional levels of deterrence
My former political science professor at Michigan, Inis L. Claude Jr., referred to peace between the United States and the Soviet Union (now Russia) during the Cold War as “prudential pacifism” — peace not based on morality or philosophy, but on the prudence of mutual deterrence. There was only one flare-up — the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 — which was resolved prudently. Now, with the rise of China as a nuclear superpower, will we continue to have prudence in a three-way nuclear balance, especially when China and Russia may be partners?
While we have deterrence at the nuclear level, today we are experiencing the failure of deterrence at the conventional level: wars in Ukraine and Israel, and reckless behavior of China in the South China Sea and Taiwan. (Walter Russell Mead, “A World Without American Deterrence,” The Wall Street Journal, Oct. 30).
My thesis is that we should have continued stability at the nuclear level, but that stability opens things up for mischief at the conventional level.
Deterrence is based on two variables: capability and credibility. Capability is physical and objective, while credibility is psychological: is the actor perceived by the other as willing to use that capability? The required capability is assured destruction. At the nuclear level this means a second-strike capability, such as land-based weapons in hardened sites or the mobility of submarines with offensive capability. There is hope of missile defense in the future.
At the nuclear level, assured destruction does not require equality, only sufficiency: man dies but once. At the conventional level, assured destruction would normally require superior capability. In fact, equality can become an incentive to strike first, given the advantages of a first strike.
At the nuclear level, a 145-page report from the Congressional Commission on U.S. Capabilities and Defense Strategies, called “America’s Strategic Posture,” recommends substantial improvement of our nuclear force given the threat from China and Russia. Former National Security Advisor John Bolton writes in “Both Parties Can Agree on America’s Nuclear Peril,” The Wall Street Journal, Oct. 26: “Our capabilities and the entire nuclear-enterprise infrastructure needs modernization, upgrading and recapitalization to meet the Sino-Russian threat.”
Consistent with the recommended build-up, the Defense Department recently announced a new bomb 24 times more powerful than the one dropped on Hiroshima, Japan, ending World War II, a capability “to credibly deter and, if necessary, respond to strategic attacks, and assure our allies.” (FOX News, Oct. 30).
The report also noted the importance of missile defense to protect people, “’that can deter and defeat coercive attacks by Russia and China,’ Ronald Reagan’s seminal vision.” (Bolton, Ibid.). There is need for funds “for missile defense as a critical part of deterrent of a World War, of current conflicts in Israel and Ukraine and potential conflicts in the Pacific.” (Riki Ellison, “Building Missile Defense Capability,” Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance [MDAA], October 27, 2023). Brigadier General Frank Lozano states: “… we need to make sure that we’re fielding a (defensive) capability by 2030 that will protect us in a way that our enemies look to exploit.” (Lozano, MDAA, Ibid.).
Thus, we need to build offensive and defensive capability at the nuclear deterrence level. This is the capability variable in the capability plus credibility formula. If we were first to develop a dependable defense, we would theoretically have a first-strike capability with an invulnerable population. The moral question President Ronald Reagan would ask, perhaps, is whether we should share that technology with all mankind.
Why have we failed in deterrence at the conventional level? It appears to be a credibility, not a capability, issue. One can point to the feckless image of the U.S. president, the weakness of the security team, the dysfunction of American government, or the puerile withdraw from Afghanistan. More fundamental is the very deterrence of the nuclear powers themselves. This nuclear deterrence inhibits the use of American conventional power. This inhibition combines with traditional isolationism, now expressing itself as “America First.” (George F. Will, “Surging GOP isolationism as a dreadful development in a dangerous time,” The Washington Post, Nov. 1). The U.S. does not want to see itself as the world’s policeman; therefore, it does not deter others at the conventional level.
— James W. Pfister, J.D. University of Toledo, Ph.D. University of Michigan (political science), retired after 46 years in the Political Science Department at Eastern Michigan University. He lives at Devils Lake and can be reached at jpfister@emich.edu.
This article originally appeared on The Holland Sentinel: James Pfister: The nuclear and conventional levels of deterrence
