James Pfister: Thucydides and the Chinese-U.S. summit

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Thucydides, who wrote about the Peloponnesian War in 431 BCE, as well as other political and military science subjects of interest to esoteric philosophers, is popularly known for the “trap,” where there is a compulsion to war between an established superpower and a rising superpower, such as the United States (herein U.S.) and China. This theory is not without its academic critics, as is any prominent theory.

The basic idea is that the dominant state lives in a status quo largely to its liking. With the rise of another state with its own interests, parts of that status quo come into conflict, like the status of Taiwan, or the fisheries of the South China Sea. Even if the two states want to maintain peace, real conflict of the zero-sum type will arise. Even Xi Jinping himself has urged the avoidance of the Thucydides Trap. (Alek Chance, “The Problems with the Thucydides Trap,” ICAS, May 19, 2015).

James W. Pfister
James W. Pfister

The question here is whether the recent Chinese-U.S. summit of November 2023, held in San Francisco, moved the needle regarding the Thucydides Trap. My thesis is that there were positive developments especially in the area of communication, but that the U.S. continued emphasis on competition, the status quo, and containment was inimical to peace. Perhaps, it is natural that the challenged state be more conservative and defensive regarding the future.

I believe most progress was in the area of communication. Xi undertook what David E. Sanger called a “charm offensive,” with emphasis on practical issues and not polemics. (New York Times, November 16, 2023). Gone was the “wolf warrior” tone, where China criticized the U.S. in an aggressive way. An example of the practical approach was the agreement regarding fentanyl chemicals, which our Secretary of State called “concrete stuff.” (Sanger, Ibid.).

Likewise, the agreement on military-to-military communications at various levels will be useful in avoiding misunderstandings and misperceptions. Also, the emphasis on senior officials of each country traveling to the other for talks should contribute to concrete perspectives in search of win-win outcomes. Xi and Biden met for four hours in talks. Throughout the trip Xi’s tone was described as businesslike. (Vivian Wang and David Pierson, “In Talks with Biden, Xi Seeks to Assure and Assert at the Same Time,” Nov. 16, 2023). Xi suggested he and Biden get on the phone to talk if a troubling issue arises. (Editorial Board, “The Xi-Biden summit accomplished little. But it really mattered,” The Washington Post, Nov. 16, 2023). Xi requested that China not be portrayed as a “villain” in American communications. (Sanger, Ibid.) Xi also communicated with American business leaders where he pushed for investments in China. At the banquet dinner Xi’s communication was personal, speaking of American assistance with China during World War II. He recalled his own personal time in Iowa in 1985 as part of an agriculture exchange. (Wang and Pierson, Ibid.) The business leaders gave him a standing ovation.

Xi also urged that the U.S. lighten up on the “competition” theme. He stated that competition “’only sows mistrust.'” (Wang and Pierson, Ibid). He said: “’The number one question for us is: Are we adversaries, or partners? ... If one sees the other side as a primary competitor, the most consequential geopolitical challenge and a pacing threat, it will only lead to misinformed policymaking, misguided actions, and unwanted results.’” (Wang and Pierson, Ibid).

Very importantly, Xi criticized the U.S. attempt to “contain” China, which he said was “futile.” He said the Earth is large enough for both nations; he had earlier criticized America’s “’myopic, competition-centric view of the world.’” (Wang and Pierson, Ibid.). Sanger saw Biden as competitive and wanting to contain China, “hoping he (Biden) will have more time … to rebuild manufacturing competitiveness and hem in China’s gains in the Pacific.” (Sanger, Ibid).

Certainly, in the area of military weapons, competition is necessary for self-defense. Technology is also involved with military development. AI-related projects are involved. Here, competition is to be expected. But in the economic and political realms, cooperation for mutual benefit is possible. To avoid war in the trap, it is necessary for China to expand. The U.S. should negotiate a reasonable expansion of China. Taiwan would be a good place to start.

James W. Pfister, J.D. University of Toledo, Ph.D. University of Michigan (political science), retired after 46 years in the Political Science Department at Eastern Michigan University. He lives at Devils Lake and can be reached at jpfister@emich.edu.

This article originally appeared on The Holland Sentinel: James Pfister: Thucydides and the Chinese-U.S. summit