James W. Pfister: Collective security and the Ukraine War
The Ukraine War has dominated the international news since it began in February 2022. Americans are divided; a recent poll shows 51% of Republicans say the United States is doing too much; 32% about right; and 17% not enough (Marquette Law School Poll in July). Our security is not directly involved, it costs a lot (more than $60 billion), and we have depleted military supplies. This does not sound like “America First.” Why?
My thesis is that our approach to the war stems from the League of Nations concept of “collective security,” Jan. 10, 1920, which has developed into Articles 2(4) and 51 of the United Nations Charter. Collective security in its pure form holds that all nations come to help the victim of an attack, regardless of their national interests, like in domestic law the victim of an attack is protected by the law regardless of the merits of a dispute.
Article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, which followed the devastation of World War I, states: “The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League.” The League did not outlaw all use of force, however. This gap was closed by the Kellogg-Briand Pact of Aug. 27, 1928. It renounced the recourse to war for the solution of international disputes. It was the basis of liability at the Nuremburg and Tokyo tribunals. It was the precedent for Article 2(4).
In the Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945, the basic principle is Article 2(4): “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state….” In Article 51, a limited version of collective security was presented along with the natural law right of self-defense: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations…” until the Security Council acts. NATO is based on Article 51, with NATO’s Article 5 as mutual protection for all members, an example of pure collective security.
These principles of collective security going back to the League and the non-use of force going back to the Kellogg-Briand Pact, now Articles 51 and 2(4) of the UN Charter, respectively, create a foundation in international law for a more stable world, a milieu goal to enhance world order, not self-interest per se. This is a worthy goal for American foreign policy in Ukraine.
There are four implications of these principles for our policy in Ukraine. First, it is not necessary, even harmful, for Ukraine to join NATO. The principles will lead to Ukraine’s defense without the provocation to Russia of a NATO membership or a commitment by the United States to become directly involved in a dispute with Russia, a nuclear state. With a large Russian population, Ukraine is likely to have continued civil strife and conflict with Russia. Instead, the G-7 gave an “enduring pledge” to provide Ukraine weapons for defense. (Editorial Board, Wall Street Journal, July 24, 2023).
Second, United States and NATO participation in the war is less provocative to Russia when conceptualized as defensive principles than when seen as an aggressive incorporation of Ukraine into an expanding NATO threatening Russia.
Third, Russia wins if it does not lose; Ukraine loses if it does not win. If it does not lose, Russia will outlast Ukraine’s defenders just as North Vietnam outlasted the United States. The only way to end the war successfully is for Ukraine to win it. Sufficient modern weapons should be provided on a timely basis to win, so long as the context is defensive and not aggressive against Russian territory or possessions, like Crimea.
Fourth, these defensive principles rooted in international law do not apply to Taiwan. They apply only to legitimate states. Taiwan is not a state nor a member of the United Nations. It is a part of China, a state; there is no linkage between Ukraine and Taiwan.
The basic principles herein are the foundation of the international rule of law. They are well worth our efforts.
James W. Pfister, J.D. University of Toledo, Ph.D. University of Michigan (political science), retired after 46 years in the Political Science Department at Eastern Michigan University. He lives at Devils Lake and can be reached at jpfister@emich.edu.
This article originally appeared on The Daily Telegram: James W. Pfister: Collective security and the Ukraine War
