James W. Pfister: Collective security or spheres of influence
As the one-year mark passes in the Ukraine War, we can look at American foreign policy and ask whether the United States is pursuing collective security, a concept founded with the League of Nations after World War I. Article 10 of the Covenant of the League states: “The Members undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League.” “All Members” means states one is not allied with as well as one’s allies and partners. Since we had no contractual treaty obligation to defend Ukraine, our support of Ukraine would be an example of collective security.
The use of force under the UN Charter is governed by the Security Council, where the five permanent members, including Russia and China, have the veto. Therefore, the UN is not supposed to use force against one of the permanent members of the Security Council. But there is the natural law concept of self-defense in Article 51, which operates outside of the Security Council, until the Security Council acts. Regarding Ukraine, is the United States doing unilateral collective security, under Article 51, with the aid of its allies and partners? Also, in Warsaw recently President Biden spoke of perpetuating freedom: “What literally is at stake is not just Ukraine. It’s freedom.”
Freedom is an American ideology, as are democracy and human rights. Is President Joe Biden’s policy collective security plus American ideology? Many of the foreign policy elites seem to support collective security as morality. A New York Times editorial referred to a “moral and ethical obligation” to help Ukraine; a Washington Post editorial said it would be a “moral travesty” if an outcome helped Russia “in any way.” It said that “Western stability and civilized international conduct rests” on the principle of the respect for state sovereignty. This is Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. Are we risking nuclear war over collective security, morality, ideology and Article 2(4)?
We may be skating on thin ice with this exuberant foreign policy. As we move from a unipolar world to a multipolar one, spheres of influence take on more meaning. During the unipolar period, Graham Allison stated: “the entire world had become a de facto American sphere.” (Cited by Emma Ashford, Foreign Affairs, Feb. 20, 2023). The United States is now stuck on the borders of both China, with Taiwan, and Russia, with Ukraine. As China and Russia grow in power to have their own spheres of influence, should the United States climb down from its unipolar role to avoid a devastating, even a nuclear, war? Allison reminds us that Putin, “…commands an arsenal of roughly 6,000 nuclear weapons that could kill us all…” (Washington Post, Feb. 22, 2023). Who wants to gamble with Putin’s mental stability, especially if he faces humiliation? And China, with nuclear weapons, is unlikely to give up Taiwan. A war with China is unthinkable in its devastation, even within the United States.
My thesis is that unilateral collective security, going around the Chinese and Russian veto in the Security Council, is premature in a tri-polar world of ideological diversity and nuclear weapons. Ashford writes: the Ukraine war “…shows the potential for catastrophe if U.S. policy makers cannot move past their unipolar mindset.” Is America’s insistence on unilateral collective security, plus promoting its own ideology for all mankind, a major threat to world peace?
It will be more difficult for the United States to adjust to a multipolar world because it is a democracy. The adjustment may appear as weakness; no politician wants that image. In fact, politicians may compete in bravado, as if we are in a sporting game. School yard theories may arise, as in an article by Rep. Mike Gallagher, R-Wis.: “Stand Up to Bullies and Defend Taiwan.” (Wall Street Journal, Feb. 22, 2023). Sen. Tom Cotton, R-Ark., goes back to the old 1930s Hitler example (Wall Street Journal, Feb. 8, 2023), common to the American mind, but an old, pre-nuclear era, precedent. We need modern geopolitical thinking. We need win-win relations among the tri-poles. We do not need America on China’s and Russia’s borders.
Unilateral collective security or spheres of influence: the latter is less likely to lead to catastrophic war.
James W. Pfister, J.D. University of Toledo, Ph.D. University of Michigan (political science), retired after 46 years in the Political Science Department at Eastern Michigan University. He lives at Devils Lake and can be reached at jpfister@emich.edu.
This article originally appeared on The Daily Telegram: James W. Pfister: Collective security or spheres of influence
