Jim Dey: Big difference between courts of basketball, courts of law
Feb. 7—The controversy surrounding Terrence Shannon Jr.'s return to the University of Illinois basketball team has calmed locally, but it is not over nationally.
A federal judge, based on complicated legal principles related to liberty/property interests, due process of law and the requirements surrounding the granting of injunctions, last month ordered the UI to rescind Shannon's suspension.
That created an image the UI sought to avoid — having a player accused of the serious crime of rape playing for all the world to see.
The faux morality play represents manna from heaven for some sportswriters. Self-appointed sanctimonious guardians of the national consciousness, some routinely embrace the highest moral ground.
There's an obvious audience for that type of screed, and sportswriters' platforms and writing skills give them credibility. After all, there's hardly a drunk in any bar who could say it better.
One — Gary Parrish of CBS Sports — recently did so. While some might applaud his ill-informed attack, former UI College of Law Dean Vikram Amar wrote a lengthy article for a legal publication about the "ridiculous" content of Parrish's column and suggested that "some sports journalists may want to go to law school before they opine about the law."
Why should Amar suggest a tutorial? Because people like Parrish embarrass themselves and do a disservice to readers when they treat legal controversies as though they're talking about the wisdom of the designated hitter or whether a coach should go for it on fourth down.
Parrish's column, which spoke sorrowfully of the judge's decision, effectively suggested the UI could have ignored it.
How so? He said it was "Underwood's call to have (Shannon) play in games" because "no federal judge is in charge of a coach's rotation." Parrish argued it is "nonsense" for the UI to assert it has "no choice" but to restore his playing status.
Parrish said he relied on "multiple attorneys" for his claim that "no federal judge" can "alter or influence Brad Underwood's playing rotation."
Amar explained in detail why Parrish's legal arguments were "wide of the mark" — or, "to use Parrish's word, nonsense."
For starters, accusation does not constitute guilt. Second, Shannon's professional aspirations were threatened by the UI suspension, creating the possibility of "irreparable harm" to him. Three, to suspend Shannon, the UI needed to do more than rely on the Kansas allegations.
That portion of Amar's argument follows U.S. District Judge Colleen Lawless' decision to reinstate Shannon.
Amar acknowledged that no one is required to like the judge's decision. But he said "Parrish's criticism reflects an ignorance of law in general and constitutional law in particular."
As for the lawyers Parrish consulted, Amar said "they must not be sophisticated constitutional thinkers or federal court practitioners."
Amar wrote that Parrish's most ill-advised claim was that the judge can't tell Underwood whom to play. While true, he said that's "beside the point."
"To say that a coach can decide not to play a player for many reasons is not to say that all reasons are permissible," Amar wrote.
Amar noted that "by focusing on basketball considerations only, Underwood is faithfully complying with the law — as declared and commanded in the federal court order."
Note that word: "commanded." Judges don't issue suggestions. Any deviation from compliance — a la Parrish's fanciful suggestion — would likely require the UI to explain why it should not be held in contempt for willfully refusing to abide by a court order.
