China will take the mantle of world superpower from the United States – if Russia wins in Ukraine
For seven days The Telegraph is running a series of exclusive essays from international commentators imagining the consequences if Russia were successful in its war. The full list of essays so far can be found below.
China and its alliance with other opponents of the West is the most serious challenge to world peace and prosperity since the Second World War.
If Putin achieved his objective of annexing Ukraine – subjugating its people to ruthless tyranny – the responsibility for this would substantially rest with the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) support. And it would benefit President Xi most of all.
It is hard to predict how global conflict between the current liberal and authoritarian orders would develop following a triumph for the latter in Ukraine. This stems in part from the normative roles played by Xi, Putin, and the leaders of North Korea and Iran, whose sense of risk and benefit is unknowable.
Nevertheless, some aspects of China under Xi’s autocracy, both internally and in its foreign relations, are well-established and likely to persist. For one, China would likely see victory for Putin as a major leap towards its desired revision of the world order. But not necessarily in the way one might think.
Hitherto, many Western commentators have clung to the notion that China seeks to reform rather than overthrow the international rules-based order established post-1945 represented by institutions like the UN. They are wrong: The revisionist nature of Xi’s vision of a China-led “new era” would move to the fore if Ukraine fell, and profoundly.
This was the clear message of Xi’s farewell words to Putin in Moscow in March 2023: “changes are happening that have not been seen for 100 years; we are driving these together”. Putin agreed. Xi was signalling a joint assault on liberal norms; indeed, one of the most obvious impacts of the war has been to show the fragility of bodies like the UN, with Russia and China’s veto effectively giving Moscow a blank cheque to get away, quite literally, with murder.
This said, the background to their expedient sharing of revisionist goals is not straightforward. The CCP are neuralgic about losing autonomy through association with any external forces. Forced by realpolitik necessity to align with Putin just before the invasion, CCP pragmatism has turned his error to China’s advantage, driving hard bargains for importing game-changing amounts of Russian energy while watching the West and Russia exhaust each other. Prolonged frozen conflict remains Beijing’s favoured outcome.
But even if Putin wins outright, crucially Xi’s plans for China as leader of a new world order include no place at the high table for Putin emboldened by victory in Ukraine, let alone turning belligerent eyes on the Baltics, Poland and Central Europe. The CCP hopes for revived growth as Russia’s main energy market, but is committed to remaining clear of reciprocal dependency.
Putin, for his part, is already visibly needy for Xi’s long-delayed agreement on “Power of Siberia 2”, a gas pipeline to China via Mongolia. He reportedly intends to pitch Beijing shortly for another via Kazakhstan.
This urgency from Moscow suits Xi’s book. He is unlikely to throw Putin more such strategic lifelines, “victory” in Ukraine notwithstanding. Ultimately, Beijing seeks direct strategic control of the Manchu Empire’s former territory in Eastern Siberia, potentially capable of meeting China’s entire energy needs for several decades and shifting the balance of power on the Western Pacific rim dramatically in China’s favour. Paying whatever he asks to prop up Putin’s declining empire does not serve Xi’s strategic turn.
Internally, the CCP regards economic advantage as subordinate to Party interests, which are currently focused on military and political rivalry with the West. China’s current surge in nuclear weapons production is a key part of Xi’s “new era” agenda, intended to challenge Western nuclear supremacy, but also to neutralise threats from India and Russia. In the heightened international tensions that would inevitably follow Russian victory in Ukraine, China’s wider efforts to strengthen its military capabilities and influence world-wide are likely to increase.
Beijing would further exploit policy disarray and divisions that contributed to Western failure to defend Ukraine effectively. In such a context, it is hard to predict whether China’s deliberate role in the debacle would renew Western resolve to impose harsher sanctions against China as well as Russia.
China is currently building up resilience against such an eventuality. Sanctions de-risking, gold-hoarding and other moves to decouple from Western dependencies (including the US dollar) should not be read as simply filling a war-chest to support the invasion of Taiwan – these policies are also strategic foundations for revisionist Chinese imperium over a new world order centred on Asia, BRICs and the Global South.
All this said, in considering how China would act and fare if Putin wins, we should not underestimate the challenges Xi’s ambitions would encounter. The Chinese economy is increasingly weak, with Xi’s policy response to date markedly ineffectual. Stagnant growth and the risk of deflation ought to deter Xi from his current spending spree on arming and organising for potential hostilities in the Taiwan Straits.
So far, no moderation in rhetoric or substance is apparent. But with or without enhanced sanctions pressures, the collapse of free Ukraine would likely have a widespread negative impact on global trade, including China’s links to important Western markets. Reduced profits from dealing with the West cannot readily be made up by China changing horses in favour of the developing world. In particular, Xi would continue to court support wherever in Europe he could generate it.
Current headwinds, in short, would not abate. Xi’s efforts to grip the domestic economy over the last decade are unlikely to fare any better in the short to medium term, particularly if Ukraine comes back under Russian control. Facing external opprobrium and regime-threatening economic instability at home, ruthless authoritarians can be tempted to rally nationalist sentiment behind a military adventure.
If his unknown personal risk assessment still compels caution, Xi might hold back from a diversionary assault on Taiwan. But with one free state newly sacrificed to tyranny, there will also be drivers in favour of calling the West’s bluff.
At the very least we may expect increased coercive pressure, military posturing and nationalist rhetoric, not only over Taiwan – with its growing danger of lethal miscalculation in the Pacific – but across other increasingly contested global space. Behind the immediate tragedy of Putin’s bloody adventure, Xi’s China will remain the chief agent of global insecurity. The UK, its allies and partners must give this reality the attention it demands.
Other essays in the ‘What If Putin Wins?’ series:
‘Putin’s plot to destroy Nato is reaching its devastating climax’ by Aliona Hlivco
‘Europe’s fascist future awaits’ by Dr Thomas Clausen
‘If Russia wins, expect the worst genocide since the Holocaust’ by Karolina Hird
‘Putin’s next conquests are already in his sights’ by Ivana Stradner
With Ukraine’s resources, Putin would be unstoppable by Liliane Bivings
