Trump’s self-interest could bring Middle East peace
So, it looks as if we have a ceasefire at last in Gaza. What happens next?
First of all, we’ve been here before. Every single conflict between Israel and Hamas over Gaza has ended in a ceasefire. This was generally sooner rather than later – as after Operation Cast Lead over New Year 2008/9, when I was in New York with the then-Foreign Secretary David Miliband and engaged in often tense negotiations with Arab foreign ministers and with Israel. And they guaranteed conflict would resume at some point, because neither side had gained what they wanted.
This war has been different. For a start, it has lasted far longer than any previous conflict with Hamas. The October 7 pogrom was unprecedented in its savagery and intent: Yahya Sinwar aimed to start a regional conflagration that would either weaken Israel to the point of surrender or destroy it as a functioning state, though neither happened. In fact, it is Hamas and Hezbollah that have been destroyed as functional military forces, the Iranian threat has been greatly reduced and the Assad regime in Syria – a key enabler of both Hezbollah and Iranian expansionism in the Levant – has collapsed. Sinwar transformed the region, just not in the way he wanted.
And that is positive. If you speak to many Syrians, Iraqis and Lebanese about the impact the war has had on their own countries, they are happy: they might not like Israel but they have no love for Islamists and want Iran cut down to size.
Israel has shown a determination and internal cohesion that looked unlikely when thousands were demonstrating against the current government’s plans for judicial reform. Hassan Nasrallah may have gloated that Israeli society was weaker than a spider’s web but it’s Hezbollah that looks fragile. The new regime in Damascus is making nice with both the West and the Arab Gulf states, keenly aware that it needs the support of both to survive and to rebuild. The Abraham Accords did not collapse. And there is again talk that a Saudi-Israel deal can be revived.
But there are real challenges ahead. The first of these will be maintaining the peace. Will Hamas keep its side of the bargain, really release all the remaining hostages, in the knowledge that this removes their only insurance they have, and allow power sharing or international supervision? Will Israel really allow Gaza’s border with Egypt to resume functioning, given that this was the conduit for all of Hamas’ logistics before the war? Will Israel stand by while Hamas tries to rebuild and, if not, can it simply resume the conflict from where it left off, as Netanyahu claims Trump assured him he could? As I set out in a recent Policy Exchange report, Iran, even in its weakened state, will try to cause trouble, as it is already doing in Syria, Lebanon and indeed the West Bank.
The answer to all those questions is the same: it’s doubtful. And what about reconstruction and governance in Gaza? Before the conflict, there was a certain amount of prosperity there, built on Qatari cash: it is remarkable how many people who claimed Gaza was under siege now lament that so much was lost. That same money was also financing Hamas, which Israel will not allow to happen again. So where will all the cash needed to rebuild the infrastructure of the Strip come from?
If Hamas want to reestablish political control over Gaza – through a mixture of appeals to Islamist solidarity, revanchist nationalism and brutal intimidation, they’re going to have to do it without significant external support – even from Iran, which has its own domestic political and economic problems and wasted billions of dollars on building up an infrastructure of terror in both Lebanon and Syria which has just gone up in smoke.
If Israel wants to bank the significant gains it has made and use them to construct a new regional order within which it can at last take its rightful place, then part of the answer has to be a new political dispensation for Palestinians. If the decrepit Palestinian Authority is to be the means to achieve this, it will need to be reconstructed and properly funded. And Gaza cannot simply be left to stew. We need a plan which works for Israel as well as for Palestinians – one which ensures Hamas can no longer exploit Palestinian distress to build a base from which to attack Israel again.
The final unknown is Netanyahu. It may be that the Israeli Prime Minister sees a ceasefire as vital for his own political future. He may calculate it will enable him to turn his attention to the Iranian nuclear programme – the head of the snake – before perhaps resuming hostilities with Hamas. The two most senior representatives of the religious settler right – Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben-Gvir – may pile pressure on Netanyahu to adopt this high risk-high reward approach. But the PM, who knows a ceasefire has majority support among Israeli voters, may opt to build a new coalition which is closer to the centre ground of Israeli politics.
He could make the sort of concessions on Palestinian governance that the Saudis – for example – will need if they are to do a deal. And that may conceivably be something Trump might want to help deliver. After all, as Barack Obama could tell him, the Nobel Peace Prize is quite something. That really would be the start of a new order in the region.
Sir John Jenkins is a senior fellow at Policy Exchange and former UK Ambassador to Saudi Arabia
