What the Next Lunar New Year Holds for China
Tuan Pham
Security, Asia
What should we expect from Beijing this year?
What the Next Lunar New Year Holds for China
Around this time last year, I wrote a two-part series looking back at 2017 for hints of Chinese strategic intent, and then looking forward to 2018 for Chinese strategic actions. I asserted then that Beijing would try to promote abroad “socialism with Chinese characteristics” and seek to displace the Western-oriented and U.S.-preeminent world order. Also, I claimed Beijing would further develop the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and exercise a more assertive foreign policy. So, with the onset of the new Lunar Year on February 5, let’s examine how accurate were the forecasts for 2018 and what to expect from Beijing in 2019.
Promote Abroad “Socialism With Chinese Characteristics”
Beijing expanded the numbers of Chinese think tanks in response to past government’s call for “new types of think tanks with Chinese characteristics to tell the China’s story.” According to a recently released report on global think tanks, China increased the numbers of its think tanks from 435 to 507 in 2018 (17 percent growth). The continued think tank surge is part of a national strategy to improve policy making and influence domestic and international public opinion. This strategy also aims to increase China’s soft power around the world and promote “socialism with Chinese characteristics.” All of these Chinese think tanks still have varying degrees of government sponsorship and affiliation.
In late-January 2018, at a Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) leading group meeting to discuss how better to deepen the overall reform of the central government, Xi approved several policy documents to include the “Guiding Opinions on Promoting the Reform and Development of Confucius Institute.” The new policy directed the Confucius Institute to focus on “serving Beijing’s major powers diplomacy with Chinese characteristics . . . and improving the quality of education” and to become an important force of “soft communications” between China and foreign countries.
A month later, Xi issued a directive to cultivate greater support amongst the estimated sixty-million-strong Chinese diaspora. He called for “closely uniting” with overseas Chinese in support of the Chinese Dream. Moreover, Xi called for uniting as part of the greater efforts and activities of the United Front—a CCP organization designed to build broad-based domestic and international political coalitions to achieve the party’s objectives. He hoped these overseas Chinese citizens will collectively cooperate to counter political foes of the CCP, advance the party’s political agenda, and help realize broader Chinese geo-economic ambitions such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
On December 18, speaking on the fortieth anniversary of China’s transformative 1978 reforms, Xi staunchly defended Beijing’s embrace of “socialism with Chinese characteristics” and glowingly spoke of its benevolent benefits to the world. He called “the pursuit of reform and opening-up and socialism with Chinese characteristics a milestone in realizing the Chinese nation’s rejuvenation,” and further stated that “China’s development has provided successful experience and offered a bright prospect for other developing countries as they strive for modernization, representing a great contribution of the Chinese nation to the progress of human civilization.”
Displace the Western-oriented and U.S.-preeminent World Order
Last December, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) released a report to the U.S. Congress on “U.S. Defense Implications of China’s Expanding Global Access.” The report describes China’s expansion through military access and engagement; the BRI and Digital Silk Road initiatives; technology procurement; and a wide-reaching economic, political, and social presence. The worrisome expansion reflects Beijing’s strategic objectives to displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, expand its overseas presence in terms of bases and partners (and potential future allies), extend the reaches of its state-driven economic model, and eventually realign and restructure the world order in its favor as the preeminent global power. In 2018, China further expanded its extant base in Djibouti and eyed future projects in Cambodia, Philippines, Vanuatu, Israel, Greenland, and Antarctica. All told, under the BRI, Chinese companies played a key role in the construction and operation of more than forty ports and airports across thirty-four countries. Furthermore, like many overseas Chinese facilities, they could be quickly and easily repurposed for military use.
Last month, the U.S. Director of National Intelligence released the 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment and then testified to the U.S. Senate. He asserted that Beijing is prepared and postured for an “ideological battle” with Washington. China is spreading “socialism with Chinese characteristics” to displace the U.S.-led democratic free market system and the greater Western-oriented and U.S.-preeminent world order. Globally, China under Xi is aggressively spreading its political system in the developing world through the BRI and employing predatory practices to gain the competitive economic edge.
Develop Further People’s Liberation Army
The PLA recently outlined its plans to develop and deploy artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities for its forces in future high-technology warfare. The PLA is reportedly shifting from conventional destruction to AI-powered high-speed and extreme destruction operations. China plans to win wars by shifting the focus in warfighting from “systems confrontation” to “algorithms competition.” Beijing believes that achieving superiority in algorithms ultimately will produce “war-fighting superiority.”
Last December, a prototype electromagnetic rail gun was again noted on the deck of a PLA Navy (PLAN) combatant ship, supposedly conducting at-sea testing of an experimental naval gun that uses magnetic force, rather than an explosive charge, to propel its projectile, potentially giving the gun greater range, lethality, and destructive power than a conventional weapon. According to sources with direct knowledge of a U.S. intelligence report on the electromagnetic railgun, a warship-mounted railgun is expected to enter the PLAN by 2025.
Last month, General John Hyten (Commander, U.S. Strategic Command) reiterated the recently released DoD’s 2019 Missile Defense Review’s assessment that China has rapidly developed hypersonic missile technology and may deploy them starting in 2020. More troubling is his warning that “we (United States) don’t have any defense that could deny the employment of such a weapon against us, so our response would be our deterrent (nuclear) force.”
Also, the PLAN’s first domestically designed and built aircraft carrier (CV-17) has just completed its fourth round of sea trials in the Yellow Sea and could be commissioned as early as April. The PLAN purportedly plans to operate six carriers by 2035 to include future nuclear-powered ones with electromagnetic catapults, unmanned aerial vehicles, and advanced carrier-borne stealth fighter aircraft.
Exercise More Assertive Foreign Policy
Last spring, China restructured its state media to better control domestic content and create a bigger public diplomacy (propaganda) machine to better convey Beijing’s strategic message and to better shape public opinion abroad. Both objectives align with Xi’s goals of ensuring that the domestic and international audiences hear the messages that he wants them to hear, see the images that he wants them to see, and believe the narratives that he wants them to believe. In his eyes, all messages are political and thus subject to state and CCP’s control.
Beijing also announced the merger of three national radio and television entities to create a single Voice of China (VoC) to “guide hot social issues, strengthen and improve public opinion, push multimedia integration, strengthen international communication, and tell good China stories.” The VoC employs fifteen thousand employees across dozens of bureaus around the globe, producing media programs in more than sixty languages to provide a reassuring and benevolent image of China, one that blunts any concern about Beijing’s growing power and influence in the world. The VoC will complement similar “sharp power” activities by the Confucius Institutes and United Front. Altogether, these influence organs are intended to promote the Chinese foreign policy agenda and explain Chinese ideas and values, and in a way that wins the country supporters abroad.
Last month, in a speech marking the fortieth anniversary of the 1979 “Message to Compatriots in Taiwan,” Xi held out again “one country, two systems” as a model for Taiwan. Xi warned Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen that unification must be the ultimate goal of any talks over its future. He also said efforts to assert full independence could be met by armed force and that the “Taiwan question” was a Chinese internal affair and he would not tolerate any “foreign interference.”
China has long resorted to discreet salami-cutting tactics (persuasion and coercion) to diplomatically and economically isolate Taiwan and set the conditions to eventually retake the island-nation. In 2018, however, Beijing accelerated the tempo of salami-cutting despite drawing unwelcome global attention and criticism. China accepted an excessive political and economic cost to woo over Taiwan’s allies. To date, El Salvador, Dominican Republic, and Burkina Faso have cut diplomatic ties with Taiwan and instead formally recognized China—leaving only seventeen nations that officially acknowledge Taipei. Next in Beijing’s crosshairs may be the Vatican and Palau.
In 2018, Beijing also renewed its forceful pressure campaign to undermine Taiwan’s democracy and promote allegiance to Beijing through information operations (persuasion, intimidation, and coercion) across media, academia, and businesses. There is growing evidence that the Chinese government also interfered in Taiwan’s elections last November. Taiwanese citizens were apparently bombarded with anti-Tsai and anti-Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) content through social media and online chat groups promoted by China’s “50-cent army” of paid social media trolls. Taipei has initiated several investigations into the allegations that Chinese money went to fund Taiwanese candidates opposing Tsai and the ruling DPP.
What to Expect in 2019
This is the year of “ji hai,” or the earth pig, and it is often considered an auspicious year in terms of wealth and fortune. For China, however, the year of the pig will probably be a transitional reset year marked with some strategy and policy recalibrations.
In 2018, Beijing did not fully anticipate the nature, scope, and extent of American “whole-of-government” pushback under President Donald Trump. Xi also did not foresee bipartisan Congressional support for Trump’s pushback, U.S. popular and international community support, BRI setbacks, and the Chinese declining economic trend lines. Xi gambled that Trump would not fully commit to the new muscular U.S. National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy. Xi hoped Trump would acquiesce like previous administrations, the BRI would continue to expand, and the Chinese economy could weather the trade war. He was misguided on all accounts, particularly regarding the deceptive strength and stability of the Chinese economy. Xi is now urgently trying to find an acceptable accommodation to the prolonged trade dispute without appearing to bow to U.S. demands.
As outlined in a recent article titled “On U.S.-China Trade, Will Xi Jinping Keep His Promises To Trump?,” Xi faces a dilemma. He can either accept an unpopular deal with structural changes that he can mitigate on the margins and ensure enduring economic prosperity or pursue a nationalistic course that will further weaken the economy, foment social unrest, and erode the CCP’s political legitimacy and authority. At risk is the much-cherished Chinese Dream that he has embraced as his own. The first path will keep the dream alive while the second will deflate it.
So, until the trade talks successfully conclude with a mutually acceptable and enduring agreement, Beijing actions will be tempered and measured, and Xi will refrain from any provocative behavior that could upset the delicate negotiations. Afterwards, Xi and the CCP will be at an inflection point. They will need to decide whether or not to double-down on China’s assertive activities in 2018 to brazenly challenge U.S. preeminence. Alternatively, Beijing could choose to tone down their political rhetoric and public diplomacy, and scale back their forceful actions. China could once again assume a lower profile in accordance with Deng Xiaoping’s iconic dictum of “hide our capacities and bide our time, be good at maintaining a low profile, and never ever claim leadership.”
I assert that Xi will choose the latter despite the potential political and popular backlash from some quarters of the CCP and some segments of the Chinese populace respectively. All in all, Xi believes that China took two steps forward in 2017 and 2018, and must now take one small step backward in 2019 while still moving forward in the coming years. The backstep is necessary if he is going to keep the Chinese economic engine running on all cylinders. That being said, the explicit and implicit strategic objectives remain unchanged. Beijing will continue to challenge U.S. preeminence and the Western-oriented world order. China will expand and protect its political and economic interests through sharp power and predatory economic practices. Xi will pursue new diplomatic and economic partnerships via the BRI and widen and deepen its security influence. Additionally, Beijing will further develop its capabilities and bolster the international standing of the PLA to become a military superpower. Finally, China will increase and enhance its global military access through potential basing options in Africa, Europe, Latin America, and Oceania. But Xi will do so, more subtly, cautiously, incrementally, and low-key.
At the end of the day, Beijing will never abandon its national goals and global ambitions. China may on occasion slow down or take a small course correction, but it will always eventually return to its guiding North Star—the expansionist Chinese Dream. The next opportunity to do so will be the 2020 U.S. presidential cycle which brings with it the possibility of a new administration with new priorities and new opportunities that Beijing can shape in its favor. For Washington, Beijing may become again emboldened and accelerate the pace of its deliberate march toward regional and global preeminence if left unchallenged and unhindered. Like a boulder rolling down a steep hill, China’s problematic behavior will be much easier to stop now than waiting until it gains speed and momentum.
Tuan Pham has extensive professional experience in the Indo-Pacific, and is widely published in national security affairs and international relations. The views expressed therein are his own.
Image: Reuters
