OPINION: Ukraine war offers few good options

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Istvan Dobozi
Istvan Dobozi

In a recent edition of the Boston Globe, I took exception to how Richard Haass, the president of the Council on Foreign Relations, views the current war in Ukraine. Haass lays all of the blame for the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian war on one person: Russian President Vladimir Putin. He is certainly not a lone voice, but in a historical context the blame should be more broadly shared.

Just because Putin is committing a brutal aggression that is more and more like Adolf Hitler’s invasion of Poland in 1939 doesn’t mean the West is totally innocent. This is no excuse for Putin: Russia’s perceived sense of insecurity in no way justifies the senseless destruction and savage attacks on innocent people with whom, as Putin often claims, the Russians are closely connected by historical and other ties.

However, as early as 1948, the legendary foreign policy guru George F. Kennan argued against Western attempts to detach Ukraine from Russia. He later called NATO’s eastward expansion a major blunder.

In 2014, during the first Russian-Ukrainian war, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger warned, “The West must understand that, to Russia, Ukraine can never be just a foreign country. Ukraine should not join NATO, internationally they should pursue a posture comparable to that of Finland." Kissinger added that it was vital for Ukraine to carefully avoid displaying any institutional hostility toward Russia.

Before the first Russian-Ukrainian war in 2014, Ukraine had a critical choice: neutrality or NATO. The political elite in Kyiv opted for NATO, despite the fact that before the war only 13% of Ukraine's public saw NATO as the best security policy for the country.

The Ukrainian people paid a high price for the wrong decision of their elite: they lost the Crimea and the Donbass regions went under effective Russian control. The Ukrainian economy is still suffering from the lack of serious reforms and systemic corruption. The standard of living is 10% lower today than it was a decade ago. And now the country faces near-total destruction and possible dismemberment by an insecure Russia long obsessed with Ukraine’s geopolitical status.

It cannot be completely ruled out that the Kremlin has deliberately hyped up the security threat posed by the increasingly pro-Western Ukraine as an excuse to force Ukraine into a satellite status. It’s clear, however, that the unfolding Ukrainian tragedy could have been avoided if Kyiv and the West had listened to wise people like Kennan and Kissinger.

Putin first railed against NATO’s eastward enlargement at the 2007 Munich Security Conference, calling it a “serious provocation” to which he promised a serious response. The Russian attack on Ukraine in 2014 was triggered by Kyiv’s association agreement with the European Union. Moscow sees the EU as NATO’s lobby.

But why did Putin schedule his new war against Ukraine for this winter? The international environment was favorable: the perceived weakness of the Biden administration, the inauguration of a new, inexperienced German government, the deepening European energy crisis and the strengthening Russia-China power axis.

In addition, massive, sophisticated Western military technology kept pouring into Ukraine.

It is now likely that Putin’s strategic calculation extends beyond the "Finlandization" and demilitarization of Ukraine or further territorial mutilation of the country. Ukraine is both a goal and a tool for Putin. His maximalist goal is creating a new European security order by driving America out of Europe with its troops and weapons, including nuclear missiles.

Prior to the new war, U.S. military intelligence believed that Russia, relying on its vast military superiority, would force Ukraine to its knees with lightning speed. But the blitzkrieg forecast has not panned out. Although the duration and outcome of the war cannot be clearly predicted due to multiple uncertainties, these three realistic scenarios can be outlined:

• Ukraine decides on neutrality as a nation.

Russia’s campaign to overthrow Ukraine’s government is not going as planned, due in part to a Ukrainian resistance that has been stronger than expected. But the Ukrainian leadership did not anticipate such a total war that has depleted its resources and caused such destruction. It is still not too late for Kyiv to engage Moscow by putting permanent neutrality on the agenda as the lesser evil. The alternative is too dire to accept: Ukraine’s future as a nation, its territorial integrity and tens of thousands of innocent lives hang in the balance.

• Putin digs his own political grave.

The massive Russian losses on the battlefield and the economic hardship due to severe sanctions could lead to a mass uprising or a coup against Putin. His removal could provide an opportunity to end the war and return to relative normalcy. Ideally, even a democratic transformation could result from the mayhem.

• Russia gets bogged down in a lengthy conflict.

Even with their ongoing displays of military brutality – as also seen in Afghanistan, Chechnya and Syria – the Russians may not be able to break the resistance of the well-armed Ukrainian population, which continues to enjoy Western support. It is possible that the Russians may get bogged down in urban guerrilla warfare that eventually leads to a shameful ultimate withdrawal.

Which one of these three scenarios will be realized? It’s hard to say. The first scenario would be ideal, while the West supports the second scenario. Unfortunately, however, there is a high probability that the third scenario will be the one that plays out.

Istvan Dobozi is a former lead economist at the World Bank, and led the organization's energy program in Ukraine. He resides in Sarasota.

This article originally appeared on Sarasota Herald-Tribune: Russia's invasion of Ukraine may lead to a sad outcome for all parties