Risks and Dangers at the Zaporizhzhia NPP

The reduction of personnel and the transfer of the fourth power unit to the "hot stop" state is a gross violation of the operating requirements.

Many ZNPP personnel with Ukrainian licenses have left the plant as the occupiers allowed them to leave Enerhodar. These are unit shift supervisors and station shift supervisors. Thus, there is now a critical shortage of licensed personnel at ZNPP. For example, only half of the employees are on duty according to the staffing schedule. This situation increases risks and hazards. According to the regulatory document by Energoatom, a minimum number of employees is required to operate the plant, which is not being met. Although in the IAEA notes, Russia claims that there is enough staff.

Read also: IAEA experts access roofs at ZNPP, see no signs of explosives, agency says

On the part of Ukraine, I would still demand that the IAEA check the compliance of the staffing of the operational personnel with our regulatory documents. It is imperative. Whether the power unit is operating at capacity or is in a state of hot or cold shutdown, the number of operating personnel at reactor facilities must comply with the regulatory document. Blackmail is also increasing. Some employees are forced to work even without a contract.

Read also: Russia abducts another ZNPP employee – Energoatom

Regarding nuclear blackmail: There is information that power unit No. 5 was put on cold shutdown. This was done because the steam generators at that power unit were leaking. According to technological regulations, a power unit can be in hot shutdown for no more than 100 hours a year. This power unit has been in hot shutdown for eight months.

However, the transfer of power unit No. 4 to hot shutdown is carried out with the aim of nuclear blackmail because, in my opinion, the technological and production needs for steam, as explained by the Russians to the IAEA, are not as important as safety. A power unit in a hot shutdown can be switched to the minimum controlled capacity very quickly, according to the regulations, in 17 hours. This increases the risks that in case of cooling loss of the power unit, a severe accident with melts on the cores and radionuclide emissions may develop. Therefore, when a chain reaction begins at the minimum controlled power, hazardous radionuclides, volatile ones like Y-131, accumulate in the core. Consequently, they do all these things in violation of regulations, even though the personnel must be properly trained to work on VVER-1000 reactor units.

Representatives from Smolensk and Kursk's Russian nuclear power plants now operate the Chornobyl-type LWR (high power channel reactor). This is an entirely different reactor. If we also consider that ZNPP has undergone a significant modernization during this period as part of the lifetime extension of power units, with Western equipment, with Ukrainian equipment that is not available at Russian NPPs, even with VVER-1000, the risks are growing.

As for the leaking steam generators, power unit 6, which also operated in hot shutdown all winter, was put into cold shutdown in the spring because of leaking steam generators. These are serious problems. The second power unit is good if it can be repaired, but the steam generators may need to be replaced. This is expensive equipment. That is, two power units are already in question regarding equipment integrity.

About the risks: As you know, the destruction of the Kakhovka dam was not coordinated with Rosatom. The ZNPP, which cannot produce the electricity they planned to send to the Russian unified energy system last summer, is like a suitcase without a handle. Their plans to supply the south of occupied Ukraine and Crimea with electricity from ZNPP have failed. According to my sources, the military does not coordinate their actions in Enerhodar and Zaporizhzhia NPP with the staff and management of Zaporizhzhia NPP. This is a problem. Knowing how all the coordination in Russia is done and their crookedness, we need to prepare for different developments.

Read also: Rosatom ends operations in Czechia

They are keeping Unit 4 in this state now to maintain the degree of escalation. The IAEA, for example, reported that they were allowed to inspect Unit 5 and visually confirmed that everything was working. Of course, the unit is not working, but all the equipment is fine. They also inspected the Zaporizhzhia Heat Canal but were barred from checking the locking gates on the coolant pond. Some work was done there, allegedly to strengthen it, but we know from the Main Intelligence Directorate that Russia mined the locking gate of the pond. The report also emphasizes that IAEA experts heard the detonation. It's strange that they just wrote about it now because the exits to the villages near Energodar and the nuclear power plant are under fire every night.

Last week, there were also reports in Enerhodar's telegram channels that something had flown into the area of the city's fire station. Until now, IAEA experts have not received permission to visit the roofs of the engine rooms, where there are some sniper positions. Movement is restricted, information is limited, and we have no data on radiation monitoring, which was shut down by Russia back in May of this year. The IAEA experts manually measured the radiation background and entered this data into the IAEA system of radiation conditions.

Read also: Russia prepares false flag provocation at ZNPP – Ukrainian intelligence

In other words, the only official information is from the experts currently at ZNPP, and Ukraine and the civilized world have virtually no additional information.

Everything leads to the fact that ZNPP is spinning out of control. If, in August last year, the general in charge of the occupation troops in Enerhodar said that ZNPP was either theirs or scorched earth, it is clear that they would do maximum damage to prevent the plant from working. It can only operate with the Kakhovka reservoir at full capacity anyway. Therefore, they will also steal equipment, because some equipment is unavailable at Russian nuclear power plants. They have already looted a training center with American computer programs and equipment. Therefore, we should not expect that the nuclear power plant will only start working after the de-occupation by the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

Read also: IAEA requests access to inspect ZNPP reactor building roofs

Will it be possible to restore everything? First, a lot depends on the equipment. For example, steam generators for this type of reactor are made in Russia. Second, the integrity of the reactor itself is also essential. If there is a loss of reactor cooling, even in a cold shutdown, and a severe core melt accident develops, it will take longer than in a hot shutdown, up to 8 days. But if Ukrainian specialists cannot intervene in the process, it will mean the loss of the reactor unit, which cannot be repaired or replaced.

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Read the original article on The New Voice of Ukraine