Tibor Nagy: Classify this, not that

Since the unfolding farce of one high ranking US leader after another being found to have improperly taken, kept, and/or stored classified documents, many articles have been written and TV airtime spent to minutely analyze and compare their infractions. And of course, as with everything in today’s US, the process has been totally politicized; the big question has become who is most negligent: Hillary Clinton, Donald Trump, Joe Biden, Mike Pence, or maybe someone yet to be found? Instead of wading into that debate, I’d like to take a look at the larger issue of why we classify, what we classify, how we classify, and is the system broken.

The concept for classification is straightforward, but it’s all the working pieces which make the system complex. Material requiring classification includes categories such as military operations and weapons, foreign government information, intelligence activities including sources and methods, foreign activities of the US, scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to national security, etc. It can be in the form of paper documents, electronic files (like Hillary’s emails) and even objects, like weapon systems, chemical compounds, etc. The US holds vast amounts of important secrets, obtained through various means: human agents (humint); electronic surveillance (sigint); and sifting through vast quantities of publicly available material (open source). The key is: will disclosure of its content, its existence, or how it was obtained cause harm to the US; how much harm; and for how long? It’s the “how much” which governs the level of classification and “how long” determines when it can be declassified. The classification hierarchy – Unclassified, Confidential, Secret, and Top Secret – should match the “how much” and “how long.” Different requirements exist for storing the various classification levels, with the strictest reserved for Top Secret and above – such documents can only be stored in a SCIF (Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility).

Security Clearances for US Government employees and contractors authorize them to handle material up to their level of classification. In addition, “Top Secret” can come with further restrictions which require even higher clearance levels such as “Sensitive Compartmented Information” (SCI) and other similar tag lines severely restricting access.

Before going into a job requiring a clearance – and most US Department of State employees are cleared to at least a Top Secret level – candidates go through a lengthy background investigation to determine whether they can be trusted with America’s secrets. My own took well over a year because I was born in a (then) Communist country. Once a candidate “passes” and is hired, they go through a detailed “in brief” session on proper handling and storing of classified material, and then sign multiple forms acknowledging their agreement to abide by the requirements or face severe penalties.

Employees who do commit security infractions face various penalties depending on the seriousness: it’s not the number of documents someone mishandles, but what’s in them (e.g., China’s expected economic outlook vs our best source in the Kremlin). Lesser infractions can slow promotions, but more serious ones can lead to loss of a clearance, termination, or jail.

Regulations are quite specific on who can classify information and for how long, as well as how to declassify information. With documents – paper or electronic – it’s usually the person who prepares it who determines the classification level and how long it should remain classified. One common rule on declassification – having done it numerous times myself – is that the specific item must be marked as “Declassified,” dated, the reason cited, and then signed. Regarding the storing of information on computers – US Government agencies operate two separate systems for processing material: a “low” side for items that are unclassified and a “high” side for classified. On leaving Government service, the process is repeated – I had to go through an “outbrief” and sign papers certifying that I was leaving all classified material behind and would not disclose certain things for various periods of time, including forever.

Technically, all US Government employees, including cabinet secretaries, must follow the regulations. But US Presidents are unique. They do not require a security clearance because they have access to anything and everything while serving; in effect being above any clearance. When a President’s term ends, they lose that status. (Exception – the incoming President often extends a courtesy to the former President to have access to certain classified material.) Interestingly, there is disagreement as to whether the Vice President shares the President’s special status or not.

One aspect of the current debate involves whether too many documents are needlessly classified – estimated at about 50 million annually. From my own experience I say “Yes!” At my various Embassies I’ve seen employees of certain organizations take publicly available material – like maps from foreign newspapers – and mark them “Secret” before sending them to Washington, with the logic that no one would take an interest in something Unclassified. But there is another side of the question which concerns me more – underclassification. Today’s employees process more and more material on their cell phones, especially in the age of working from home, and phones must not be used to handle classified items. As a result, material which in the past would be marked “confidential” or even “secret” is now routinely labeled “substantive but unclassified” (SBU). Coming back to Government after 15 years I was shocked at the sensitive information marked SBU.

So while the media and politicians can engage in the circus of whose discovered document stash is the most outrageous, our nation needs to consider the more serious subject – how to reform the entire classification system, addressing both over and under-classification, and make it compatible with today’s communications technology.

Ambassador Tibor Nagy was most recently Assistant Secretary of State for Africa after serving as Texas Tech’s Vice Provost for International Affairs and a 30-year career as a US Diplomat. Follow him on Twitter @TiborPNagyJr

This article originally appeared on Lubbock Avalanche-Journal: Tibor Nagy: Classify this, not that U.S. politicians documents