Ukraine’s grinding advance towards Tokmak — expert interview
Yevhen Dykyi, a former company commander of the Aidar Battalion, explained in an interview with NV Radio on Sept. 4 how the Ukrainian military breached Russia’s first defensive line, advancing towards Tokmak in Zaporizhzhya Oblast.
NV: How to understand the Russian defensive lines? How are they different? And will it really be easier for the Armed Forces of Ukraine to continue as [Commander of the Tavria operational group] Gen. Oleksandr Tarnavskyi assesses the situation?
Dykyi: Let me start with the good news since my answer to whether it will be easier to continue is negative. In assessing what has already happened, I would say that General Tarnavskyi showed great modesty. In fact, not just the first defensive line has been overcome. Our defenders have already entered the second line, and the battles are now taking place inside the second defensive line. But this doesn’t mean that we’ve breached it. So, let’s talk from the point and figure out what these lines are. The Russians’ defense in southern Ukraine has been built up for over nine months.
Moreover, it was built both strategically, i.e., they really thought about how exactly they were going to defend themselves, and in a direct, specifically constructed sense. They carried out lots of ground and engineering works there. So, what do we have as a result? The first defensive line, the one that the general mentioned, took 60% of the resources. Maybe it’s true. It was very powerful. First of all, it included the largest minefield in general, perhaps in European history. Something at least a little comparable took place during the battle of El Agheila in North Africa in 1942 when German field marshal Erwin Rommel did something similar. Neither before nor after it was repeated.
A continuous minefield over 100 kilometers long, and from 10 to 20 kilometers in depth in various areas, with combined mining: when there are anti-tank mines, and anti-personnel mines are sticked to each of them, like flower petals. That is, so that neither military hardware could break through, nor people could come up and remove these anti-tank mines. So, this was the biggest obstacle, not taking into account aviation in the sky. But this obstacle has already been overcome.
A dotted line of so-called strongholds was further behind this minefield. That is, platoon, company, and battalion-level strongholds, which were deployed on all dominant heights, firing from up there. But they weren’t connected to each other, it was just such a dotted line from the dominant heights. We have overcome this first defensive line. We have now reached the second line. And it includes the following. To begin with the amusing, it includes the so-called dragon’s teeth. I think everyone has already seen photos or videos [of those]. These are white concrete pyramids that, in the Russian imagination, were supposed to stop our tanks, somehow.
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In fact, why these pyramids were built, to be honest, is a mystery to me. The only rational explanation is that someone simply gobbled up the budget. Because there is absolutely no use from them as they don’t stop tanks. If you remember, maybe several years ago it was fashionable to put so-called energy pyramids on the tables, which were supposed to protect against negative energies. The use of these concrete pyramids is exactly the same. But this is the only funny element, followed by the unfunny. The New York Times issued a false statement that we had already broken through the second defensive line.
This statement was actually based on the fact that there were already photos and footage of how our fighters were leaving all these dragon’s teeth behind. But no. The fact is that these dragon’s teeth mark the beginning of the Russians’ second defensive line. That is, the fact that we crossed them means that we have wedged ourselves into the second line, and the fighting is actually taking place there now.
There are also minefields between the dragon’s teeth and the trenches I’m describing. This is no longer one continuous minefield, as it was on the first line, since the Russians would simply not be able to move between their own defensive lines if they were to mine everything there continuously. These are dozens of separate minefields with passages between them. There are still a lot of fields, but there is room to squeeze in between, followed by these trenches and concrete bunkers.
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If we break through the second line, we’ll reach the third one. But the third defensive line is going to be really simple. It’s not an independent line at all. It’s more like a support line for the first two, including mostly command posts, communication points, warehouses, etc. They (Russians) won’t be able to hold it. But the second line is still suitable for holding, concrete bunkers are actually worth a lot. And the main thing is the price paid.
If we regain Tokmak, by the way, for those who want to understand where the line is. When we retook the village of Robotyne, from that moment you can assume that the first line was left behind. But when we retake Tokmak, it will mean that we have taken the second line and it is completely breached. So, if or when we retake Tokmak, it will be almost impossible to hold us back.
Later, it’s theoretically possible to hold Berdyansk and Melitopol and prevent us from reaching the Sea of Azov, but it’s extremely unlikely in practice. Unfortunately, the Russians also understand this. They understand that their last chance to stop our offensive, to prevent us from reaching the Sea of Azov, and thus turning Crimea into an island, is now near Tokmak. Accordingly, all available reserves will be pulled in there. And in fact, everything will be decided there by whoever runs out of reserves first. There are some grounds for cautious optimism.
NV: And what do we understand about the resources that the enemy has. How long can they generally wage war?
Dykyi: I would say that my estimate of the military resource is close enough. And it’s good that you’ve raised this issue. The fact is that some Russian narratives are very well accepted both in the West, and even here. For some reason, it’s almost an axiom that Russia will win in case of a protracted war, since it is large and has a large resource base. And this is not the case at all. Except for the cannon fodder resource, of which they really plenty. Although, it is only enough as long as it [the mass of Russian civilians] meekly goes to serve.
I certainly wouldn’t expect any surprises for the next mobilization. But in fact, I have some doubts whether Russian cannon fodder would be enough to regularly slaughter until 2030. But I guess we’ll never know. Because cannon fodder is, of course, an important resource, but without dressing it in something, arming it with something, putting it on something to drive, and it’s desirable in something armored and that can shoot, and without structuring this cannon fodder by giving them commanders for each unit, platoon, company, battalion, etc., the cannon fodder resource is not an army by itself, it does not work.
But they have problems with resources namely for the army. The first problem is armored vehicles. We’re currently seeing a very characteristic signal. Not only have they already opened the very strategic storage, i.e., the one for the great war, for the world war. That is, they didn’t just use what was in the lineup [for the invasion of Ukraine]. But from these strategic warehouses, at least those standing in the open air, tanks, for example, covered with awnings, and most of the warehouses beyond the Urals are just like that, satellite images clearly show that 40% of the equipment has already been taken from there over the past year of the war.
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Judging by their negotiations with North Korea, they have a very big problem with ammunition. It would seem that their storages are bottomless, but it’s not like that. And of course, everything I’m saying is provided that China doesn’t change its position and, God forbid, opens its warehouses to them. Because if this happened, it would be a completely different war and completely different resources. But so far, comrade Xi [Jinping] is clearly holding this red line.
He helps the Russians to bypass sanctions, particularly to obtain components that their defense industry lacks. But only the components. Ready-made military products are categorically not supplied so as not to spoil relations with the West. And if China continues to stick to this line, the resources of Russia itself and the only two countries that are ready to supply it with everything — Iran and North Korea, will be enough, according to my estimates, for a year, no more. Here is the protracted war. By the way, the situation is similar with commanders.
NV: Ukraine also needs resources. Where can we get them? The Financial Times has recently released an article where retired UK General Richard Barrons estimated the war would last until 2025.
He notes the West will most likely begin increased supply of ammunition and equipment to the Armed Forces of Ukraine in mid-2024. Can we hope for that?
Dykyi: We can always hope for a lot. But to hope and to rely on are two different verbs. For example, we hoped very much that it would not happen, that Putin would be stopped, and no big war would take place. We hoped but failed. We didn’t prepare for this war due to our expectations, and now we’re dealing with it, we’re now completely dependent on the supplies of the allies. Therefore, although it also seems to me that there is a lot of rationale in the British general’s words, I would say that we must assume an even worse scenario.
In fact, I hope the level of supplies from the West will remain at least at the current level, or maybe the West will really decide to put an end to it and realize that there is only one way to put an end to it — to finally give us everything that we lack. But these are just hopes.
NV: And what will the war look like next year? What can you already see and analyze?
Dykyi: Nothing, to be serious. If someone tells you what they see this war looking like next year, don’t believe them. There are too many uncertainties. We don’t yet know how this summer’s offensive will end. Let’s live to see it. At least we’ll understand whether we’re entering late autumn and winter at approximately the current front line, or whether we’re entering autumn and winter after reaching the Sea of Azov and visiting Crimea. These are already two such different scenarios that it’s not really serious to forecast anything.
NV: Ukraine will probably get F-16 fighter jets. At least Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov announced before his resignation that the Defense Forces would use them in 2024. Does it fundamentally solve something?
Dykyi: No single weapon fundamentally ever solves anything. There is no Wunderwaffe, no silver bullet for a vampire. Every weapon is helpful. Each weapon is very useful, and some weapons become “game changers” for a certain period, slightly changing the rules of war. But no single weapon gives a total victory, unless we’re talking about nuclear weapon, of course. Let’s remember how the Bayraktars [UAVs] and the Javelins [anti-tank guided missiles] were a very powerful factor at the beginning of the war that helped us disrupt the so-called special military operation and force the Russians to proceed to a real war.
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And in this full-scale war, they learned to counter Bayraktars, and Javelins no longer play such an outsized role. Later, the artillery war began. HIMARS [rocket artillery systems] arrived. HIMARS made a big difference, because we immediately had a 70-kilometer line available instead of a 30-kilometer one. OK. Months passed, and the Russians adapted to this as well. Now we really need F-16s. They will also change a lot once we get them. Because this total control of skies by the Russians will finally end.
Russian aviation is currently 10-12 times superior to ours. The arrival of the F-16 will shift this ratio. By the way, there were some naive expectations before this offensive that the first Leopard tanks would appear, the Russians should see them, shout “ah, Leopards,” and run away. It didn’t happen, and it won’t happen with the F-16. But they will be helpful and will enhance our capabilities.
NV: As for Reznikov’s resignation and his replacement with Rustem Umerov, what do you expect?
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Dykyi: I see a certain symbolism here, a certain positive sign that at the moment when we approach Crimea, a Crimean Tatar will be the defense minister, who is also known for his rather consistent and radical views. I think that makes it somewhat more likely that when we get to Chonhar [the boundary between Kherson Oblast and Crimea], we won’t let our Western allies stop us, start telling us that Crimea is sacred to Putin, or don’t go any further because it will be difficult to negotiate. In this sense, Umerov’s appointment seems to me to be very significant.
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Read the original article on The New Voice of Ukraine
