Ukrainian military correspondent Andriy Tsaplienko discusses Avdiivka withdrawal and frontline threats

Ukrainian military correspondent Andriy Tsaplienko discussed the withdrawal from Avdiivka, the threat in other frontline sectors, and new appointments in the Armed Forces in an exclusive interview with Radio NV ahead of the second anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion.

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- You’ve visited Avdiivka multiple times and likely had extensive conversations with our military personnel stationed there. Initially, our military asserted that the Russian attack on this Ukrainian city was improbable to succeed. Regrettably, it did. The city is now under occupation. How did you foresee this possibility?

- I never stated that taking Avdiivka was impossible. Anything is achievable with adequate forces and resources. I believe many in our military realized at the start of this year that maintaining control of Avdiivka would require extraordinary efforts.

Given our resources and capabilities, sending additional forces to Avdiivka to unblock it or to hold Russian troops in their current positions would require exposing other critical areas. Considering the situation along the entire front line, including the shortage of ammunition, air defense systems, and aviation compared to the Russians, and taking into account Putin’s political goal to seize Avdiivka, it is evident that we cannot maintain control in this situation.

- I’m sure you’ve seen the reports in Western media following the Russian occupation of Avdiivka, detailing the supposed organization of our withdrawal from the area, as well as the numbers of prisoners or wounded left behind. Our military command has refuted some of these claims. Can you provide insight into the withdrawal process? How meticulously was it planned?

Read also: Russia’s war plan after fall of Avdiivka – expert interview

- I believe the operation was meticulously planned, considering the challenging circumstances of our conflict and all its intricacies. Why? Our commanders, orchestrating this operation, successfully deceived the enemy. With the deployment of the Third Assault Brigade and units from the Main Intelligence Directorate (HUR), supplemented by specialized border troops (notably the Third Assault Brigade), they effectively conveyed, even to the global media, the impression that our intent was to reinforce Avdiivka, not just within Ukrainian channels, but internationally.

The Russians observed the situation and responded accordingly. They underestimated the Ukrainians, assuming they would not maintain control of Avdiivka and would lose another of their top brigades. However, the withdrawal was executed to evacuate Ukrainian troops swiftly and with minimal casualties.

Videos depicting the evacuation reveal the challenges encountered, yet the departure occurred relatively swiftly. We managed to preserve the lives of our most skilled, motivated, and experienced troops. Now, it’s crucial for these individuals to recuperate while we identify and train their successors, in my opinion.

- The pressure from the invaders in the Kupyansk sector persists. There are concerns that the threat to Kharkiv Oblast could escalate, considering that a portion of the enemy’s forces stationed near Avdiivka might also be relocated there. How would you currently evaluate the threat to Kharkiv Oblast?

- Threats abound across various regions. Not confined to Kharkiv Oblast, they extend to the southern areas such as Zaporizhzhya. Currently, Robotyne faces mounting pressure, having been liberated once before, only to be targeted again by the enemy. The pervasive threat is particularly acute in the Maryinka sector, where the recent occupation of Pobeda village underscores the extent of the challenge. Vuhledar is at risk of encirclement, compounding our concerns.

Read also: Russia keeps 40,000 soldiers near Kupyansk in Kharkiv Oblast

A confluence of issues has created a dire situation akin to a perfect storm for the Russians. Foremost among these challenges is the acute shortage of weapons and ammunition. The stark reality of receiving a mere four shells per cannon daily, compared to the ample supply of 50 shells for Russian counterparts, underscores the critical nature of this shortfall. Furthermore, our air defense systems face significant deficiencies, hampering our ability to intercept Russian aircraft.

When we talk about the F-16, in this case it is a platform to which certain weapons can be added. And these weapons have to stop Russian planes, they have to be better and they have to hit further than Russian weapons. When we talk about the lack of people, we understand that the problem is that a relatively small part of the Ukrainian army is on the frontline right now.

As far as I know, the army is currently conducting an audit to find out how many people who wear uniforms and receive salaries have never been in the combat zone. Everything is being clarified now.

I think the Ukrainian command has no choice but to conduct this audit and optimize the number of people in the rear. Yes, there are a certain number of people who are involved in army supply and logistics, that’s clear. But there are actually people who are not currently performing functions necessary for the defense of Ukraine, but are wearing military uniforms. This problem has been there for a long time, it has been accumulating. Now this problem and others have come together in a perfect storm.

- A few weeks ago, there was a change in the top military command. General Valerii Zaluzhnyi was dismissed and replaced by General Oleksandr Syrskyi as the Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Along with him, new commanders were appointed. How do you assess the necessity of these changes? How do you understand the intention behind these changes?

- Allow me to pose a counter-question. When you mention ‘new commanders,’ are these individuals dispatched to us from elsewhere, or are they akin to aliens who have arrived among us? As for the new command... Provide me with a name and consider which of these individuals lack actual combat experience in the Ukrainian war?

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- No, they are not aliens from another planet; they are actually highly experienced commanders. The key distinction is that they have not previously held the positions they currently occupy nor have they had the level of responsibility they will now assume.

- I disagree with you. These people, starting from 2022 (just name any), held command positions, some of them held strategic command positions, i.e. planned strategic operations.

Do you grasp the issue at hand? We’re currently addressing matters that many fail to comprehend, as there’s a prevailing belief in Ukraine that a figure akin to Superman will swoop in and resolve their dilemmas. There’s this notion that those in positions of authority possess superhuman capabilities, akin to Superman donning a shirt emblazoned with an ‘S.’ Zaluzhnyi, with the ‘S’ insignia, swoops in and triumphs; Syrskyi, also adorned with the ‘S,’ swoops in and prevails. However, reality doesn’t align with such perceptions.

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These are regular individuals, albeit with extensive experience, particularly in commanding the armed forces. They are prone to errors. Our current objective is to minimize these errors to the greatest extent possible; I am steadfast in this belief. Hence, we must endeavor to sidestep these mistakes by enlisting individuals with genuine combat experience.

We all know who Mykhailo Drapatyi (Deputy Chief of General Staff, Brig. Gen.) is. Recall the image of the jumping infantry fighting vehicle in Mariupol in 2014, and you will immediately recollect that it was these brave individuals who inspired Ukrainians to take up arms and sent a clear message to our adversaries that we would fight to the end. Consider the role of General [Land Forces Commander Oleksandr] Pavliuk, whose strategic planning in the initial days of the conflict prevented the enemy from breaching our defensive line in the zone of operation of the Joint Forces in the east, thus safeguarding our primary combat group. And let’s not forget (Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces) Vadym Sukharevskyi (with the call sign) Barsuk (Badger), who fired the first shot of the war. When we reflect on these key figures, everything falls into place.

Understand that they are not supermen. They are just people who perform tasks and have certain tools to perform those tasks. And with this very limited set of tools, we have to deter the enemy and win.

I do not rule out the possibility of replacing these people if they make mistakes. This war will be a long one, and on the way to victory we will have many more situations where, as they say today, “we are approaching disaster.”

We will face many more instances of impending disaster if we continue to receive essential weapons incrementally. In such circumstances, we must all acknowledge that the majority of the population will be involved in the fight. There are no ‘supermen’ who will arrive to single-handedly resolve Ukraine’s victory challenges.

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