Voices: This is how Russia’s land grab could complicate the war

Vladimir Putin is preparing to announce Russia’s incorporation of four regions of Ukraine in what is said to be the largest forcible annexation of territory in Europe since the Second World War.

The land amounts to about 15 per cent of Ukraine, and the move threatens to complicate even further an already complicated and costly war. Russia’s action replicates its annexation of Crimea in 2014, and follows votes held last weekend in the two regions – Luhansk and Donetsk – known as the Donbas, and in Zaporizhzhia and Kherson further to the south and east.

A signing ceremony is expected to take place in the Kremlin today, with the decision to be endorsed by Russia’s parliament, the Duma, early next week. There is not the slightest chance of the annexations receiving international recognition; Russia’s incorporation of Crimea eight years ago remains unrecognised and the procedures leading up to the latest referendums appear to have flouted international norms even more egregiously this time around.

The referendums were held at just a few days’ notice, with marshals, supported by armed guards, soliciting votes door to door. Approval officially exceeded 90 per cent. It is not even clear how Russia will be able to administer much of the new territory because it controls only one of the regions – Luhansk – completely.

Fierce fighting is continuing in Donetsk as Russia tries to extend its gains there, and it occupies less than half of Zaporizhzhia and Kherson, although an announced Ukrainian counteroffensive in the Kherson region appears to have stalled.

This does not mean, however, that Russia’s unilateral declaration of what amounts to a new border can be ignored. It will have significant repercussions, though what they will be depends to a large extent on Putin’s intentions.

There is just a chance – a slim chance, it is true – that the annexations, while appearing to up the stakes, could actually herald an intention on the part of Russia to declare a spurious victory and leave, or at least stop at the edge of the Donbas.

In the speech last week in which he announced a partial call-up of reservists, Putin reiterated, as clearly as I have ever heard him, that the objective of what is still described as a “special military operation” went no further than Donetsk and Luhansk.

“The main goal of this operation,” he said, “which is to liberate the whole of the Donbas, remains unaltered.” Some have suggested that, by declaring the annexation of the two more southerly regions as well, Putin could be preparing a bargaining position for eventual talks, whereby the Donbas would be non-negotiable, but Zaporizhzhia and Kherson could remain in Ukraine.

An outsider – though no Ukrainian – might even hazard that the loss of the mainly Russian-speaking and Russia-oriented population of the Donbas could have advantages for Ukraine. Although the region is a repository of rich natural resources, much of its industry is obsolete and much of the land has been devastated by the war that has simmered between the Ukrainian army and Russia-backed separatist forces since 2014.

Such a prospect, of course, comes to a halt against Ukrainian reality. For Ukrainians, understandably, the loss of any territory is unacceptable, and their determination to restore their country’s 1991 borders, even to recover Crimea, has only grown as the war has gone on. Since early peace talks broke down, the message from Ukraine and its president has been “no compromise” and no exchange of land for peace. It remains to be seen whether that position would remain so iron-clad if tested at talks. But Ukraine is backed in its stance by its Western allies – and justice demands that Russia cannot be rewarded for its invasion.

It would be unrealistic to pin any hope on the most positive gloss: that Moscow could be looking for a face-saving way of ending the conflict, and that annexing the Donbas would allow it to declare its mission accomplished while representing a minimal loss to Ukraine.

That said, everything else that flows from the annexations is likely to be worse. As of next week, Russia will observe a new border with Ukraine, many kilometres to the west and the north of where that border used to be. Moscow and its forces will treat it as Russian territory.

Whether Russia will be capable of administering it, let alone defending it, is one question – to which the new call-up might be seen as a temporary answer. So long as Ukraine continues to be supplied with weapons and has soldiers to fight, however, much of the land will remain contested – so that the war and the losses will go on.

In declaring the territories part of Russia, however, new military provisions will apply. Conscripts may not be sent into a conflict zone abroad, but now they could be deployed legally (under Russian law) in these territories. Russia could also regard Ukrainian attacks across the declared border as attacks on Russia proper, and use them as a pretext for large-scale reprisals – even, in the extreme, for the use of tactical nuclear weapons.

This seemed to be the meaning of Putin’s warning that “in the event of a threat to the territorial integrity of our country”, Russia would “make use of all weapons systems available to us”. As seen from Moscow, Russia is suddenly a bigger country, with new borders to defend. Moscow’s unilateral annexations will also have an effect on Ukraine, although the precise implications might be harder to predict.

The first response, already voiced by president Zelensky and others, is – understandably – indignation, rejection and a determination to fight on with even more resolve than before. At the same time, however, Putin’s declaration sets the seal (for the time being, at least) on the reality that Ukraine has lost territory, and quite a lot of territory at that.

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It has been relatively easy for Ukraine to present its resistance – the fact that it saw off Russia’s apparent designs on Kyiv, for instance – as decisive, and its relatively small recent advances as sweeping successes. But the map has always told a slightly different story.

Even if Russia’s gains have not met its ambitions, most of the land Russia took in the early stages of the war has remained in Russian hands. That includes the crucial corridor to Crimea. Even if Kherson and Zaporizhzhia become bargaining chips in the endgame, it seems extremely unlikely that Russia can – or will be forced to – give up the rest.

The best that can be hoped for is that Moscow is looking for a way to leave with something to show for its trouble. But Ukraine might be looking at the diminished shape of its country for years to come. In coming weeks, that might spur it to fight harder. But what happens then to morale if the new border holds? And when might Ukraine’s talk of complete victory then seep away into grim recognition of at least partial defeat?