How the war will look like in 2024 – expert interview
The situation at the front raises many questions, namely what will happen next and whether the war has really reached a stalemate. More and more Western media and analysts say the counteroffensive has fizzled out and Ukraine needs a major shift in strategy to get a second wind.
Military expert Oleksandr Kovalenko explained in an interview with NV Radio on what Kyiv and its Western partners need to focus on in terms of weapons and military strategy in the coming year. In his opinion, besides drones, which are being discussed a lot now, conventional means of defeating the enemy need to be a central element of future war plans.
NV: What can be changed in our military strategy?
Kovalenko: In a recent article for The Economist, [Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine] Valerii Zaluzhnyi also tried to focus the attention of our international partners on what Ukraine needs to achieve greater success in 2024: what we expected from our partners, what we didn’t receive and how this affected the situation on the battlefield.
Read also: ‘If you think the price is high now’ – Kirby outlines price U.S. will pay if Ukraine loses war
Therefore, the most important thing is stable support from the international community and our partners. Because without it, we won’t be able to keep even what we have liberated. This, of course, is the whole list of items that are constantly being discussed, both for offense and defense. A lot has already been said about the F-16 [fighter jets], about the need for these aircraft. But in addition, this is also the list of missile weapons for these aircraft, so that it’s a complete weapon system. This is support for long-range aviation radar surveillance – the AWACS [Airborne Warning and Control System]-type reconnaissance aviation, namely these types of aircraft. It cannot stop at just handing over F-16s, giving AIM-9 missiles and telling us to fight as we want. No, AIM-9, as well as AIM-120, AGM-158, AIM-119 [missiles are needed].
NV: Let’s explain the abbreviations to our audience.
Kovalenko: If we’re talking about AIM-9, these are air-to-air missiles, depending on the modification, of small and medium range. If we’re talking about AIM-120, these are of long range, beyond 100 km. That is, to be able to destroy enemy aircraft at long distances even before it flies to a location where it can, for example, drop guided air bombs. If we’re talking about AGM-158, it’s a cruise missile that would help destroy land targets. To make it clear: this missile is similar in functionality to Storm Shadow and SCALP EG. AIM-119 is an anti-ship missile that can be used in the Black Sea against the Russian Black Sea Flotilla and its ships. There is also another list of items, very interesting. And if we have all this in exactly this amount, the F-16 will be a rather serious, multifunctional threat to the Russians. And it would seem that this should be enough.
But no, that will not be enough. Because all these weapons will work effectively if there is adequate support from AWACS aircraft.
NV: AWACS is a reconnaissance aircraft, right?
Read also: Ukraine and U.S. forge strategic partnership for joint arms production
Kovalenko: It’s is a long-range radar surveillance reconnaissance aircraft. So, when General Ben Hodges [former commander of the U.S. Army in Europe] says in his comments and interviews that the U.S. Army would not send its units into the offensive without having total control over the airspace, yes, indeed, I completely agree with Ben Hodges on this issue. We have to fight without having control over the airspace, while the Russians have air superiority. But who is to blame for this? Ukraine or international partners, who will hand over the first planes to the Ukrainian army only next year? Although we asked about them back in 2022. The same goes for ATACMS [ballistic] missiles. They can solve many things, including aviation issues. They are effective on airfields, if they are equipped with the M39, M39A1 cluster warhead. But we received them only in October. They immediately demonstrated a high level of effectiveness…
NV: Apparently, there are very few of them.
Kovalenko: Yes, they demonstrated a high level of efficiency with the use of a small number of missiles themselves.
NV: Ukraine’s spy chief Kyrylo Budanov asked for at least 100 ATACMS missiles. Judging by the fact that there are currently no visual examples of their use, we’ve been provided with but a few of these missiles.
Kovalenko: Yes, a small batch, let’s say so. And even more so, as far as I remember, I thought we would receive them in August-September 2022, but we received them in October 2023. Let’s hope we get more.
Read also: Ukrainian military makes headway through two of three Russian defense lines
We need artillery. The Russians have the opportunity to un-mothball and remove from storage an average of 350 towed howitzers per month. Do we get at least that many towed howitzers per month from our partners? Do we get at least 100, or at least 50 per month? No! We don’t have a steady supply of that amount every month. Ammunition, proportional supply of ammunition? I can note that yes, indeed, they [the West] are stepping up production, and supply will also increase. But so far, we cannot achieve any kind of complete parity with the Russians in terms of the number of artillery shots and the amount of artillery systems used.
Many questions about tanks, about heavy armored vehicles. Because the Russians can repair, restore, and upgrade from 100 to 150 tanks per month. And the question is do we get that much from our partners? No! We don’t receive even 50 tanks per month on any stable basis. This is the problem. As long as the Russians can compensate for their losses, but cannot build up capacity, they won’t be able to go on the offensive. But it’s a systematic work for them. They can systematically compensate for losses. We are completely dependent on our partners to compensate for losses or increase our capabilities. And what our situation will be like in 2024 will depend only on them. Indeed, our soldiers are professional, they have experience, they’re much better than the Russians, but they cannot fight a tank with their bare hands.
NV: Ukrainian drone manufacturers claim a personnel shortage, such as engineers and assemblers. They say they assemble 50,000 FPV drones per month. That’s a lot. Is it enough? Could drones substitute for artillery?
Kovalenko: I wouldn’t compare drones with artillery. They’re very often compared, saying that in some sense drones replace artillery. That’s not quite so. Drones have a completely different functionality than artillery. In addition, the drone is vulnerable to radio electronic warfare systems, which are their main enemy. And some, like FPV [first-person view] drones, cannot operate deep in the rear. This is a short-range weapon, while artillery has a range of 30, 40, and 50 km, and missiles have a range of 80 km and more.
Read also: F-16 Coalition working to increase the number of F-16 fighter jets provided to Ukraine
In addition, an FPV drone drops either a grenade or an RPG-7 [hand-held anti-tank grenade launcher] charge. That is, this warhead load is about 1.5−2−2.5 kg, while artillery shells are much more powerful. Especially if we’re talking about high-explosive fragmentation missiles or others. And cluster ammunition is also very useful. In fact, a drone doesn’t replace cluster ammunition. And we need a lot of both shells and drones. We lose a huge number of drones per day in the war zone due to losses associated with radio electronic warfare. And those videos of successful strikes on Russian equipment, destruction of manpower that we see are actually a small percentage compared to the amount [of drones] that was lost.
NV: Somewhere about 10%?
Kovalenko: Something like that. Therefore, we must understand that there can never be too many drones. They will always be few. Even if 50,000 are produced, that’s great. Although such a figure is also very interesting, I don’t know whether it corresponds to reality. But even if 100,000 are produced, we’ll still need more.
NV: You mentioned radio electronic warfare. Zaluzhnyi spoke about the need for a super weapon, so to speak. Maybe these are some trench radio electronic warfare systems, portable?
Kovalenko: Yes, trench radio electronic warfare systems are becoming popular. There are more and more of them. Although they cannot completely replace a full-fledged system. But nevertheless, they can really protect a certain infantry position from drones.
NV: Does that mean we also need to focus on the supply of radio electronic warfare systems? They say the Russians have a very well-established system.
Kovalenko: The Russians are ahead of Ukraine in radio electronic warfare systems, both in terms of quantity and even quality. We must admit that.
NV: Almost all experts already say the war will continue next year. What kind of industrial, financial, and human resources do we need for such a long campaign? What can we focus on in such a long race?
Kovalenko: One way or another, we must understand that we should also develop our military-industrial complex, and not just rely on supply from partners. We should develop our own production. Because, in fact, we’re talking about a situation when the launch of any element of the military-industrial complex, an enterprise means that it may hit by Russia.
Therefore, it’s necessary to understand where and what can be produced in Ukraine, and where production should be taken outside the country.
Read also: Insufficient weapons and personnel – Zelenskyy looks back on Ukraine’s 2023 counteroffensive
Of course, our partners also understand the war won’t end tomorrow or the day after tomorrow. They also take their military-industrial complex to a completely different scale of production.
We’ll have extensively fortified bridgeheads, including in Donetsk Oblast, the Lyman-Kupyansk axis, and partly Zaporizhzhya Oblast. Yes, we’ll have to leave some positions and locations, and this should also be taken reasonably, without panic or depression.
But there are bridgeheads where our presence may even expand, which is gradually emerging into a perspective that is real and quite tangible.
The new phase of war is the phase of principles and stubbornness, the phase of rationalism and endurance. The phase of weakening and exhausting the enemy to the stage when we have enough strength to deliver a devastating blow and more than one.
Read also: Ukraine witnesses 90% decline in aid from partners
If anything, the concept of our actions in the near-term perspective is not to liberate as many square kilometers as possible, but to kill as many of the invaders as possible and destroy their equipment, with the additional objectives of saving the lives of our servicemen and the mechanized equipment.
Our task is not only to hold the positions that we have (I mean specifically in terms of ensuring the staffing of units), but also to increase this provision. This will allow us not only to hold the defense, but also to advance more successfully and expand the number of territories that will be liberated.
We’re bringing the voice of Ukraine to the world. Support us with a one-time donation, or become a Patron!
Read the original article on The New Voice of Ukraine
