What weapons can North Korea send to help Russia against Ukraine – interview

Oleh Katkov, editor-in-chief of the Defense Express military portal, explained in an interview with NV Radio on Sept. 11 how Russia is trying to find military resources in North Korea and whether Pyongyang can significantly help Moscow.

NV: Let’s start with the shells that North Korea can supply to Russia. <...> How massive could the shipments of shells and weapons that North Korea can supply to Russia really be?

Katkov: If we consider only North Korea, we must understand that their armed forces are basically an artillery army. If Military Balance [annual assessment of the military capabilities] is to be believed, which, in my opinion, is the best in terms of an overview of who and what kind of weapons has, it’s about 21,500 pieces of artillery systems, ranging from 120mm mortars to exotic 170mm howitzers. If we take the calibers that are compatible with the Soviet-Russian ones, we’re dealing with 120mm mortar shells, 122mm, and 152mm rounds.

Read also: Russia turning to North Korea a sign of weakness — Ukrainian intel

And we must understand that the total number of artillery systems of 21,500 looks quite than high, suggesting a large amount of ammunition that may be at North Korea’s disposal. And this is a huge amount. But another factor is that these stocks are unlikely to have been replenished since 1991 in significant quantities. On paper, an astronomical amount [of ammunition] can really be in their ammunition warehouses.

But the question is how old are they, in what condition are they, or are they in combat condition? This is highly questionable. A few weeks ago, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu came to Pyongyang on a rather unusual, extended visit. And maybe it was just an inspection trip.

NV: A separate aspect, I’ve seen comments online that the supply of something from North Korea, where there is a so-called Friendship Bridge between Russia and North Korea, the railway infrastructure in North Korea itself is not too developed.

OK, Russian Railways resources may be involved, but it’s still 10,000 kilometers to haul something to the front line. This 10,000-kilometer logistics leg, how significant is this factor?

Katkov: A significant factor. But no one is surprised by the appearance of T-55, T-54, T-62 tanks in Ukraine, which are being restored near Chita [city in far eastern Russia]. Not really, if taken in global terms, there is a big difference between [Russia’s] Zabaykalsky Krai and North Korea. Yes, the logistics leg will increase by several thousand kilometers. But we don’t live in the 19th century when weapons were transported on horse carts. And not everything rests on the railway. Some of the most important things can probably be airlifted. Mass goods [can be transferred] not only by railway, but also by sea. That is, the question of how to transport weapons is much easier for Russia than the question of where to get them.

NV: Does the world have an opportunity to somehow prevent this?

Katkov: I think not, unfortunately. Regarding North Korea, if we consider the possibility of its supply only: how else can it be influenced if it’s under the most severe sanctions in the world? This is a country in exile. I can’t even imagine. Regarding the impact on China? Practice also demonstrates that, despite already proven facts, China supplies dual-use components to Russia.

Read also: Russia won’t abandon missile strikes on Ukraine's infrastructure — Ukrainian intelligence

The components that Russia uses in building, for example, its own aviation, including helicopters and fighter jets, meaning that the West is unlikely to have any influence. And what happened recently? Of course, this is not my profile regarding geopolitics, but the G20 with its final communiqué on Ukraine. It fully demonstrates that, for example, India’s leader very happily shakes hands with [Russian Foreign Minister Sergei] Lavrov, smiling.

NV: Reuters recently quoted various experts saying that Russia is trying to ramp up production for its artillery shells to two million pieces per year. <...> Two million a year, would that be enough?

Katkov: Russia’s expenditure on ammunition, thanks to which they advanced quite actively, unfortunately, more than a year ago, particularly in the Bakhmut area, with up to 60,000 artillery shots [per day], was absolutely the peak. If this pace is maintained throughout the year, it’s necessary to produce about 22 million rounds of ammunition annually. Regarding even two million, there are questions whether Russia will really be able to produce that much.

And even when we’re talking about assessments of the Russian military-industrial complex, we must pay close attention to the wording they use. Because it’s easy to write down the production of artillery shells, and even 23mm rounds can actually be marked as artillery shells.

NV: Those would be for an anti-aircraft gun? For ZU-23, right?

Katkov: Yes. And we can count additional hundreds of thousands of rounds that could be produced there. In any case, we must understand that the Russian defense industry, if we consider it separately from the Chinese factor, it won’t be physically able to sustain the expenditure by the military. Not even if two million munitions are produced. Even if there are four million, or eight million, it won’t be sustainable. This applies both to tanks and any other type of weapons and military equipment.

NV: Then let’s talk about what Ukraine can do about it. First, there was information that Russia has deployed more than four dozen of its Iskander systems around the borders of Ukraine, which can fire two types of missiles, namely Iskander-M and Iskander-K ballistic missiles. A total of 46 systems. Is it something that can potentially be destroyed?

Katkov: Two factors. First, yes. That is, Iskander is a mobile ground-based operational and tactical complex. Indeed, the Iskander-M missile is a ballistic missile. The declared range is up to 500 km. I personally believe this is the range for use as a missile with a special nuclear ammunition. The range is less with a conventional high-explosive fragmentation part. Regarding Iskander-K, this is the R-500 missile. This is a cruise missile similar to the Kalibr missile but has better characteristics in terms of maneuverability and the ability to bypass air defense, i.e., it’s somewhat more advanced.

But conceptually, this cruise missile is similar to Kalibr. Regarding how to hunt them down. First of all, it’s difficult as it’s a mobile complex. Its standard use is that it deploys into position, deploys in literally 10 minutes, shoots, rolls up 10 minutes later, and drives away. That is, if we expect it, we can hit it while it’s moving into position and deploying. If it’s already deployed, localized, we have very little time to strike it.

But when we talk about how to destroy it, we approach the most difficult issue of relations with Western countries. Regarding the fact that their weapons cannot be used on Russian territory. It’s just a cruel restriction that remains in place. And in fact, if this condition didn’t exist, then [U.S.-made long-range missile systems] ATACMS would have been handed over to us, for example. In this case, the ATACMS is actually an excellent counter-battery tool against the Iskanders. With all the caveats, but nevertheless the most successful, since the minimum flight time of the ATACMS missile for 300 kilometers, if I’m not mistaken, about seven and a half minutes.

Read also: Neptune anti-ship missile struck Russian S-400 radar in Crimea — report

The Iskander conventional or Bastion coastal missile complex is physically unlikely to be able to leave the position in seven and a half minutes. But there is a condition from the West not to use their weapons to strike Russian territory. That is, in this way, if they simply deploy the Iskanders, as they do, of course, at a significant distance from the border, since the ballistic firing range is up to 500 km, we must have the appropriate combat capabilities of our own missile systems. At the same time, upgrading [Ukrainian-made anti-ship missile system] Neptune to strike ground targets is quite often discussed

Neptune, even upgraded, will in any case be a cruise missile with a subsonic speed and a rather long takeoff time. But, again, everything will depend on how Russia will actually use these Iskanders. Because there may be such an option that, understanding complete impunity, they won’t use all the necessary security measures to save resources and equipment: they won’t change positions, and the location will also be known. And the very deployment site could be destroyed both with the crews and the equipment itself.

We’re bringing the voice of Ukraine to the world. Support us with a one-time donation, or become a Patron!

Read the original article on The New Voice of Ukraine