Why Poland opposes Ukraine-Germany rapprochement – interview

Warsaw-based journalist Olena Babakova explained in an interview with NV Radio on Oct. 2 how Kyiv got caught in the turbulence of Polish electoral politics.

NV: There was a statement by Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki, warning Ukraine against closer ties with Germany. This is how he was quoted by local media.

Babakova: Listening to Mateusz Morawiecki, we can say that there are less than two weeks left before the elections in Poland, and this was a piece of heavy rhetorical artillery being deployed.

NV: I’m sure that a part of our audience doesn’t understand at all where this discourse came from.

Is it a betrayal if [Ukrainian President Volodymyr] Zelenskyy supports Germany getting a permanent seat on the UN Security Council? Polish Twitter commentariat seems to think so.

Babakova: You know, it’s like when a television series has been running for 10 seasons and you must do a recap. Let’s try [to explain it] briefly. Let’s start with the fact that Germany is Ukraine’s ally as much as Poland. Ukraine is an official candidate for joining the European Union. Ukraine is a state that has declared its desire to be a NATO member. Both Warsaw and Berlin are members of both organizations. Therefore, they’re Ukraine’s allies, at least nominally, absolutely the same. Indeed, Poland has been very supportive of Ukraine both since 2014, and since the annexation of Crimea and the start of the war in the Donbas, and since the full-scale invasion, both at the level of diplomacy and military and economic cooperation.

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One of the reasons for this is that the Law and Justice (PiS) party, which has been in power since 2015, can be called anti-Russian, precisely in this sense, if we mean the Russian state. It’s clear that Ukraine is impressed by this now as we have a common enemy. But the broad context is greater, because PiS is not only an anti-Russian party, but it’s also an anti-German party. I would even say that some critics are tempted to call it an anti-EU party, although I don’t really think so.

Criticism of Germany from PiS politicians, starting from the party’s head and program ideologist Jarosław Kaczyński, and ending with such party headliners as Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki, Interior Minister Mariusz Kamiński, Defense Minister Mariusz Błaszczak, etc., relates to the fact that the relations between Warsaw and Berlin look quite tense during the last eight or nine years. There are several reasons. The reason, which is probably the most discussed in the Ukrainian media, is a similar conflict with Ukraine in the realm of historical politics.

In short: Poland believes that Germany didn’t pay enough for the consequences of the Second World War. It paid in the direct financial sense, i.e., that Germany owes reparations to the Poles. The Polish Sejm [parliament] even has a special commission that calculates the amount of these reparations. However, it has been working for several years, but hasn’t calculated everything. It [Germany] also owes in a symbolic sense. The German political discourse shows a great guilt towards the Jewish people and the state of Israel, which is obviously due to the Holocaust committed by Nazi Germany during WWII.

There is also guilt before Russia, which has become a one-state incarnation of the Soviet Union. Accordingly, all the wrongs inflicted on residents of the occupied Soviet territories, for some reason, they cause sympathy exclusively for the Russian people, but not for the Ukrainian and Belarusian people. Although, by the way, this is also changing. But in addition to this conflict in the realm of historical memory, there are also things that are more pragmatic. For example, the fact that Germany has proportionally too much influence on the EU common policy, both foreign and domestic.

This primarily concerns, e.g., climate policy. That is, Germany is very much promoting the green agenda. It’s trying to make sure that mining, the use of coal and other fuel hydrocarbons are limited at the EU-wide level. This solution is useful for German business. On the other hand, e.g., for countries like Poland, which mines its own coal, and it occupies an important part of the national energy balance, this solution is not so useful. In addition, the modernization of industry itself is [expensive].

NV: We heard a very beautiful statement from German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock that the European Union would expand “from Lisbon to Luhansk.” Do we correctly understand that after all, when we talk about Ukraine’s European integration process, Germany can make such statements, but Poland cannot?

Babakova: I don’t know. It seems to me that, in principle, Poland can also make such statements. Look. There are systemic problems in Polish-Ukrainian relations, and there are crisis moments. The crisis moment in which we are now is Poland before the elections. Poland before the elections and the grain crisis. Instead, there are certain systemic problems. The Polish-Ukrainian dialogue is full of great mutual sympathy, but it’s not full of great mutual trust, as we see at every critical moment. Since Warsaw is constantly suspecting its vis-à-vis, namely Kyiv, that the Ukrainians will begin to negotiate with other EU countries, and not with Poland, thus undermining some special status of Polish-Ukrainian relations.

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Similarly, Ukraine disregards Polish claims and Polish questions regarding Ukrainian domestic and foreign policy. Look. It’s the same both under [former Ukrainian President Petro] Poroshenko and Zelenskyy. As soon as the Poles start to make some claims against the Ukrainians, whether in the realm of history or economy, what is the first answer of Ukrainians? This is all at the behest of the Kremlin. There are some real Poles who love Ukrainians very much, they help Ukrainians, and there are some wrong Poles who play into the Kremlin’s hands and start saying that they’re unhappy with something. Again, refusing to treat your vis-à-vis with respect.

As we can see, Warsaw behaves in a completely mirror-like manner. PiS politicians, e.g., former [Polish] Prime Minister Beata Szydło, wrote about it directly on her social networks, and not only her. I don’t quote, but I’m retelling the content. That there are some decent Ukrainians who are grateful to the Poles for help, for refugees, for military aid, and there are some “wrong” Ukrainian elites who are trying to play in tandem with Germany. Again, the reason for Kyiv’s actions is not its own economic interests, it’s not its own domestic policy, which may also be relevant for President Zelenskyy and his team. No.

It must be some kind of connection with an external entity, i.e., with Berlin. What do I see as a lack of respect? No matter how the Polish elections end, this problem, unfortunately, won’t disappear. Part of the blame, if we can talk about blame here, is really on the Polish side. This is, in fact, the desire to be such an older brother for Ukrainians and tell them how to behave properly. But part of the blame lies with Ukraine. Poland has a daily expertise on Ukraine: there are several analytical centers with dozens of people professionally dealing with Ukraine.

At the same time, Kyiv begins to pay attention to relations with Poland only when something major happens. On the other hand, if we talk about systematic knowledge of Polish politics, who is who in Warsaw: there’s almost no systematic interest in Polish politics, economy, interests of various stakeholders in Polish society and economy. That is, we start caring about relations with Warsaw only when a crisis moment arises. The crisis is over, everything is fine, Poland is our advocate in Europe, so we can go do something else.

NV: Kyiv just hosted a defense contractors forum. Ukraine’s ambassador to Poland said that no Polish company arrived, although we invited them. How can you explain such things? Is it connected with the elections and the tension around the Ukrainian issue?

Babakova: No, I don’t think it is connected with the elections. If we talk about the economy, Ukraine is quite a risky market for investments. And it was before 2022, and after 2022 [even more]. By and large, investing in Ukraine is a certain luxury for businesses from relatively rich countries, which can compensate for their losses if something happens. That’s why Germany, Japan, and the United States were willing to invest in Ukraine. It seems to me that you have pointed to such a very correct point in Polish-Ukrainian relations that we have many talks about mutual help, values, and brotherhood.

But when it comes to some very practical things like this, nothing happens. This is an issue of investment, and the issue of, e.g., the Polish-Ukrainian border. Just as things looked bad on it before the war, they look bad now. Both passenger and individual passenger traffic take place with long delays.

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Again, last year it was promised that there would be some big Polish-Ukrainian strategic partnership agreement, where we would finally get a definition of the main areas of our cooperation: what the relations between the countries should look like, what is a priority for them. This agreement still doesn’t exist. That is, such painstaking and daily work, the preparation of this agreement is not underway.

There are very emotional statements that we’ve helped you so much and you should be so grateful to us. No, it’s you who should be grateful to us, because we protect Europe from Russia. But when it comes down to such a more practical level, someone doesn’t make it to a tender, someone doesn’t make it to an investors’ conference. Although a forum devoted to Ukraine’s reconstruction was recently held in Poland. Such events take place quite often. We shouldn’t forget about it either.

NV: And what about that side? What do we hear about Ukraine from [former Polish prime minister and president of the European Council] Donald Tusk’s Civic Platform party?

Babakova: By the way, if you looked at the photos from this march, you could see Ukrainian flags and flags of independent Belarus. Actually, this is related to the question of how the Ukrainian migrant community in Poland reacts to the situation. Tusk is a very experienced politician. And it seems to me that every experienced politician knows very well that speech is silver, but silence is gold. That’s why Tusk comments on Ukraine’s topic very sparingly. I can recall only one or two of his statements over the past few weeks that were about the Ukrainian economy having to work.

It’s natural that Ukraine wants to sell grain and other agricultural products abroad, that it’s necessary to ensure uninterrupted transit of these products, while dishonest businessmen who sell them on the Polish market should be punished. And in general, an effective state and effective governance depend on this, i.e., to ensure transit and to counteract any illegal sales. On the other hand, almost no one comments on this issue, except for Tusk. And the leftists don’t particularly comment on this issue.

Again, why is Morawiecki so actively exploiting this topic now? Because, unfortunately, there are also significant anti-Ukrainian sentiments in Polish society along with the great pro-Ukrainian sentiment and the desire to help Ukraine.

NV: What are these anti-Ukrainian sentiments about? About the fact that Ukrainians are coming and taking their jobs? That Ukrainians are coming and taking away their benefits?

Babakova: There’s a migration note in this anti-Ukrainian sentiment. But the main one is that it has such, I would say, a more historical background. These are “the Banderites [members and supporters of the faction of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists led by Stepan Bandera] who slaughtered our grandmothers and grandfathers, official Ukraine has never apologized for that (spoiler: apologized many times), so we shouldn’t do business with these people.” There are some Polish figures who even say that the Russians and Germans killed Poles, but at least they did it in a more civilized way. But the Ukrainians did it with knives, scythes, rakes, and then they provide a description of the entire Volyn massacre.

Let’s put it this way: the fact that these figures speak about it in such a specific language doesn’t mean that this problem doesn’t exist. The problem of genocide in Volyn is authentic in Polish-Ukrainian relations, it exists. And indeed, Ukrainian political history isn’t entirely OK from the point of view of even mainstream Polish politics. But it’s precisely on this far-right spectrum that this anti-Ukrainian rhetoric is particularly popular. Because the topic of the grain crisis, by and large, has already disappeared from the front pages of Polish newspapers.

Read also: Poland admits cracks in ties with Ukraine after accusing war-torn country of being ‘ungrateful’

But exploiting this rhetoric is an attempt not to lose your radical right-wing electorate and to steal a little of the [far-right political alliance] Confederation’s electorate. With the beginning of the full-scale invasion, these anti-Ukrainian sentiments are still fueled by the idea that we give too much to Ukraine. We help it too much, while Ukrainians did not deserve so much help. In general, Poland has its own affairs, we have where to spend money.

These are far-right ones. [Confederation] is currently the main local far-right party. It will probably enter the Sejm. The question is only whether with a one-digit or two-digit result. They even went to Ukrainian embassies and brought the so-called aid bill. They calculated almost $25 billion of expenses that Poland spent on Ukraine and Ukrainians.

And accordingly, as part of such a promotional campaign, they demanded that Ukraine compensate the Poles for this quota. The not very generous Polish social package that the Ukrainian refugees received, if compared with the amount of taxes and social contributions they paid to the Polish budget, these taxes and social contributions are much more. That is, Poland even benefited financially from their presence.

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Not to mention their purchasing power, which further boosts demand in the local market. Not to mention their presence on the Polish labor market. There is one thing, if you allow, I would like to mention. Currently, the Ukrainian community in Poland has two million people, including more than a million labor migrants and about a million Ukrainian refugees. In recent years, Poland has been issuing about 10,000 passports to Ukrainian citizens per year. We can state that about 40,000-50,000 Polish citizens of Ukrainian origin have appeared in Poland in recent years, mainly in large Polish cities.

Theoretically, this should somehow be translated into political life. That is, Polish parties should want to get their votes in the elections, somehow putting Ukrainians on their party lists. It’s normal when there is a large national minority, and its representatives can work in the authorities. But if you look at this year’s lists, they don’t include Ukrainians. The fact that PiS and the far-right don’t include them is OK, but there are none in the leftists and the Civic Platform.

NV: Why? What do you think?

Babakova: I’m not a representative of Polish politics. I think it’s necessary to ask the political technologists of the Civic Platform and the leftists. Instead, the obvious explanation from me is that these politicians think that it’s not worth paying special attention to this topic.

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Read the original article on The New Voice of Ukraine