Why is Russia building a nuclear power plant in Burkina Faso

If the project is implemented, the country will become the third on the continent to have a nuclear power plant.

Russia is going to build a nuclear power plant in Burkina Faso. This news was reported by Reuters, citing statements by the local Ministry of Energy. If the project is implemented, the country will become the third on the continent to have a nuclear power plant. One plant is built on French reactors and operates in South Africa. The second is being built in Egypt by Rosatom.

At first glance, this news may seem absurd. Burkina Faso is one of the poorest countries in the world, with a population of more than 20 million. The total generation capacity is about 380 MW (according to some sources, 407 MW). The total electricity production in 2021 amounted to 1.76 billion kWh, and consumption was 2.64 billion kWh. With such volumes, the nuclear power plant looks strange at the very least – the plant is too large for such consumption volumes. In addition, launching a nuclear power plant will require creating (or scaling up) a national energy industry. This means building power transmission lines and resolving the issue of dispatching and distribution. In the end, the entire capacity of the national power system is not enough to balance the NPP. Finally, there is the issue of personnel.

Why NPPs, or the Elephant in the china shop

If a nuclear power plant is built, its only use may be to supply foreign markets. That is, exporting electricity to neighboring countries. Here, it is appropriate to evaluate the entire region - the state of the economy of the countries with which Burkina Faso borders.

We have an extremely rich region in terms of natural resources, where gold, uranium, iron zinc, manganese ore, bauxite, phosphorites, oil, and gas are mined (and sold). There are also reserves of tungsten and titanium ores.

At the same time, the region's countries are among the poorest in the world regarding economic development. Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana have the best GDP per PPP.

Finally, another feature of this part of Africa is extreme political instability and (with rare exceptions) skepticism about the ability (willingness) of the EU and the US to work with local states as equal partners and invest in developing their economies.

Today, only Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana can be called "pro-Western," where European mining companies operate and support local political regimes. Another "democracy" is Benin, where, in 2016, there was a peaceful transfer of power to the elected President, Patrice Talon. However, having promised to rule for only one term, he actively engaged in "reforming" the electoral law, and after the triumph of 2021 (winning the presidential election and monopolizing the majority in parliament), he began to build his own system of power.

In other countries, either a military junta is in power or politicians brought in by the military are ruling. In Mali, there were coups in 2020 and 2021; in Burkina Faso, the military overthrew the president in 2022; we read about a military coup in Niger in 2023; and finally, Togo is ruled by President Gassimba, the son of President Eyadema, who died in 2005. He came to power with the support of the army, which decided that the Constitution was not the main decider in choosing an acting president. To be fair, it should be recognized that elections were held regularly thereafter. With, of course, the support of the military and a predictable outcome.

West Africa is one of the core regions of interest for the Russian Federation. Russian PMCs or instructors are present in all problematic states to one degree or another. For example, the Wagner Group is active in Mali and Burkina Faso. Small units of this PMC (as well as their political technologists and instructors) are known to be present in Togo, Côte d'Ivoire, and Benin. Moreover, in 2023, Benin's President Talon (allegedly a pro-Western democrat) stated it was the "sovereign right of the states of the region" to invite and use Wagner PMCs. Lukoil's representative office operates in Côte d'Ivoire, with security provided by Lukom-A (Lukoil's former security service, now operating as a PMC).

It is worth noting that Lukom-A, in addition to the physical security of facilities, specializes in information gathering and electronic espionage.

Finally, Ghana is actively developing its relations with Rosneft and signed a contract with them in 2018 to supply LNG. In 2023, the country became one of the transshipment points for storing Russian "gray" oil. This is quite logical: Ghana has its own (small) exports. It does not have the capacity to store Russian and its own natural resources separately. This means that the oil from Novorossiysk looks the same as oil from Accra, with Europeans buying them both together.

Grabbing hold of the region, or "Africa is ours."

Now, it's time to return to the topic of nuclear power plants. Here, we will talk not so much about economics as politics – or rather, geopolitics.

The first question that arises is who will build it and for what cost. It is doubtful that any of these countries would have enough money to actually "buy a turnkey nuclear power plant." In Burkina Faso, even more so. Once again, it is one of the poorest countries in the world.

Thus, we are discussing a joint venture in which Russia likely owns more than half. In reality, it will most likely be a Russian facility with Russian personnel under Russian protection. It's not just about the plant itself. It is necessary to create an entire industry: to build power lines, balance power plants, make a dispatching service, and much more. If Russia controls all of this, then we can talk about control over the country's economy. Old industries will continue to work, but any development will be possible only with Russian consent or participation (after all, the electric switch will be in Russian hands).

Next, I propose returning to the table of state characteristics again. We can talk about the existence of a particular low-power regional power system. It is more or less balanced in terms of generation and consumption.

NPP construction will likely be based on VVER 1200 reactor designs. These are the reactors that Rosatom has been building recently in Russia and abroad. Even one reactor is already a threefold increase in generating capacity in Burkina Faso. If the plant is in a standard two-reactor design, we will have an addition of 20% to the total generating capacity of the region.

Thus, Russia is becoming a key player in the energy market in this part of Africa, benefitting in several areas at once:

- Influence on the development of the countries in the region. This, among other things, will be manifested in a greater tie of local governments to Moscow. After all, the implementation of any sizeable energy-consuming project will be possible only with the Kremlin's consent;

- Creation of infrastructure for the arrival of its own extractive business. Here, it is worth mentioning both already exported minerals and explored deposits;

- Creation of preconditions for becoming dependent on European, American, and Chinese mining companies operating in the region. The availability of free capacities will make buying Russian energy more attractive than producing its own on small (often mobile) power plants installed at mines.

At the same time (if the NPP is built on time), it makes the idea of creating a transnational power line from South Africa less attractive.

The most important factor is political bonuses that go beyond the region regarding their impact. Russia demonstrates that, unlike France, it is ready to implement large-scale infrastructure projects. Moreover, such activity directly depends on the level of political cooperation with the Kremlin. In this logic, the choice of Burkina Faso, one of the poorest former French colonies, is quite apparent. Investments of several billion dollars and transforming a backward country into the most significant regional exporter of electricity is an excellent geopolitical "advertisement." In other words, Russia has already sent a signal to the elites of several African countries.

The construction of the nuclear power plant and the transformation of the regional electricity market will bring together local political regimes that currently view Russia as one of their key partners. Establishing a "zone of Russian influence" will reinforce the Kremlin's ambitions to maintain its status as a geopolitical player.

Is it essential for Ukraine?

At this point, it is worth discussing another detail - the Kremlin's geopolitical bargaining for its future. In particular (or primarily) against the backdrop of the war in Ukraine. The NPP application and the series of military coups over the last 4-5 years hit France's position in the region. This is painful for Paris.

What does Ukraine have to do with it? We have a relatively simple scheme: France may be interested in slowly implementing (or freezing) the Rosatom project. Russia may be interested in France's efforts to persuade Ukraine to engage in dialogue, such as to freeze the war or "compromise." Of course, at the right time and as "one of" the voices of such advisors. This is a perfectly acceptable exchange that will cost Russia nothing.

And Africa is not the only region. The Kremlin follows its standard algorithm of creating "additional" crises before starting a dialogue on the main issue. At the beginning of the consultations, the Kremlin offers its partners (opponents) to discuss the problems "in a complex" where it will try to exchange its concessions on secondary topics for accommodations in its favor on the main issue.

In addition to Africa, the Caucasus (where France has consistently supported Armenia), Libya, and the Middle East (including the ongoing war in Israel) are also worth mentioning.

The Kremlin has already tried to implement a similar algorithm in 2016-2020 in the Ukrainian direction. The "additional" crises there were Syria, the already mentioned Libya, and the issue of gas supplies to the EU. These efforts were partially successful. Let's recall the Steinmeier formula of 2016, the attempt to "cease fire" in 2020, and the shuttle visits of European and American politicians from December 2021 to February 2022 with theses about the need for "concessions to Russia."

Then, the scheme did not work. Likely, it will not work now, either. However, it is foolish to rely on it alone. The logic of the Kremlin's actions is clear. So, there is an opportunity for our own initiative. Given the region's specifics, there is an opportunity to act in the countries mentioned above.

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